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[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.I
Any student of history who has been reprimandedfor talking about the
World Series during a class discussion of the First Amendment knows
that it is incorrect to state that a time, place, or manner restriction may
2
not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.
INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades, the Supreme Court has increasingly
distinguished in its First Amendment jurisprudence between government
actions that regulate the content of speech and those that are content-neutral.
Under current law, content-based speech regulations are highly disfavored and
are presumptively unconstitutional. 3 The Supreme Court has said, "It is rare
that a regulation restricting speech because of its content will ever be
permissible."'4 According to the Court, content-based speech regulations
represent the essence of "thought control" and of "official censorship," and lie
5
at the core of what the First Amendment prohibits.
By contrast, content-neutral speech regulations are subject to a more lenient
First Amendment standard. 6 Any well-ordered society requires laws that
control the time, place and manner of speech.7 As long as speech regulations
do not discriminate on the basis of the speech itself, and leave open ample
8
alternatives for expression, such laws are usually held to be constitutional.

' Police Dep't ofChi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971).
2 Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1980)

(Stevens, J., concurring).
I For cases expressing this principle, see infra note 74 and text accompanying notes 6479.
4 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000).
' See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2004) ("Content-based

prohibitions... have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and thoughts
of a free people."); Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320-23 (2002).
6 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("Our cases make
clear.., that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on
the time, place, or manner of protected speech ...").
7 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
8 Id.
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This article explores the mechanics, scope, and purposes of this fundamental
distinction in First Amendment law. Why do content-based speech regulations
What is so
undergo stricter scrutiny than content-neutral regulations?
over others
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certain
favors
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dangerous about
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to
the
and
limitations
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neutrality?
My answers are not conventional. Commentators and courts often explain
the First Amendment's aversion to content-based speech discrimination,
particularly viewpoint-based discrimination, 9 by reference to some ideal of
government impartiality. For example, it is often contended that the Speech
Clause of the First Amendment requires government to act as a neutral
arbitrator in the marketplace of ideas, neither distorting society's discussion of
important issues nor favoring certain viewpoints or forms of expression.' 0 In
other words, this perspective suggests that speech, like religion, is a private
matter, and should largely remain free from biased interference by the state
(subject only to narrow exceptions). According to this vision of a speechimpartial government, a distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulations serves either to identify government actions that are likely based on
impermissible speech-biased motives or to identify government actions that
would significantly distort the marketplace of ideas in favor of certain
viewpoints or means of expression.
9 Consistent with most (although not all) writing on the subject, this article treats content
discrimination as an over-arching concept that includes viewpoint discrimination, subjectmatter discrimination, and other forms of speech discrimination. For a discussion of the
various forms of content-based regulation, see infra Part II.A.
10Leading articles that justify heightened scrutiny for content-based regulations by
reference to impermissible motives or distortion include: Larry A. Alexander, Trouble on
Track Two: Incidental Regulations of Speech and Free Speech Theory, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
921, 932-933, 939, 945 (1993) (contending that the First Amendment expresses as its

primary value that the government should not make policy based on its evaluation of the
communicative effects of speech); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, PublicPurpose: The Role
of GovernmentalMotive in FirstAmendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 413, 414 (1996)
("First Amendment law ... has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of
improper governmental motives."); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53
STAN. L. REv. 767, 769 (2000) (asserting that the sole inquiry in First Amendment cases
should be whether the government acted with an impermissible anti-speech motive);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv.
189, 197-233 (1983) (asserting that the content-based/content-neutral distinction rests upon
concerns about equality, communicative impact, distortion and government motivation); and
Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv.
615, 672, 696-719 (1991) (arguing that the First Amendment should consider laws to be
content-based if they are intentionally discriminatory or if they distort public debate through
disparate impacts, whether intentional or not).
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I disagree with such an explanation. In this article, I argue that the First
Amendment does not require a government that is indifferent toward the
communicative effects of speech. It does not require government to treat the
expression of private viewpoints impartially. Nor does it prohibit government
distortion of the marketplace of ideas. The First Amendment, even as an ideal,
does not envision a government that is speech-neutral in any of these ways. To
the extent that the First Amendment requires government to treat equally
speech that it favors and disfavors, these circumstances are limited and are for
more modest reasons than the overarching goal of government impartiality.
Impartiality theories- do not explain well many aspects of current First
Amendment doctrine. These theories do not account for the many ways in
which governments regularly engage in speech-biased decisions that are
calculated to distort the marketplace of ideas, and that are usually considered to
be entirely permissible. Governments routinely impose speech preferences, for
example, in the rules and curriculum of public schools and universities, in laws
and policies affecting government-employee speech, in government speech
subsidies, in radio and television regulations, in commercial speech
regulations,11 and in anti-harassment laws - to name only a few of many
examples.
These and other accepted speech discrimination practices by
government ought to factor more heavily into how we understand the freedom
of speech and its ideals. We do not live under a system of constitutional law
that requires government to be impartial toward communication, nor anything
close to it. Moreover, it would be dangerous to seriously aspire to such an
ideal.
The central guarantee of the freedom of speech is to secure for all citizens12
plentiful places and means to communicate their ideas to the public.
Provided that this basic floor of expressive freedom requirement is protected,
the Constitution does not prohibit government from using its remaining
resources and forums to promote communication that the majority favors or to
counter communication that the majority deems harmful, distasteful, or
misguided. 13 In other words, there is nothing inherently illegitimate about
government-imposed speech discrimination - not even viewpoint
discrimination. Speech discrimination only becomes a problem when it unduly
burdens a speaker's ability to communicate a particular message or when it
occurs without public awareness.
At first glance, this theory appears to call into question any doctrinal
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations because both
have the potential to unduly burden speech. I argue, however, that it does not.
Even without the ideal of government impartiality, there remain powerful
reasons to subject certain content-based regulations to heightened scrutiny.
" See infra Part III.

12 See Police Dep't of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971).
13 See infra Part III.A.
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One reason arises from the limitations of judicial review and the difficulty, in
many cases, of determining what constitutes an unreasonable restriction on
expression without comparing how the government has regulated other kinds
of speech. A second reason involves political accountability, and the value of
requiring elected officials to be open about their speech preferences when
acting upon them, thereby including the public in decisions over which types
of speech officially to favor and disfavor.
These reasons paint a more modest and comprehensive picture of why
speech discrimination is only sometimes found to be unconstitutional. The
reasons begin to explain why courts sometimes decide First Amendment cases
by examining whether the government has singled out a particular type or
category of speech for disfavored treatment, and why in other cases courts
appear unbothered by speech discrimination. Although this framework does
not purport to explain all aspects of First Amendment law, I believe that it
provides a more accurate description of current First Amendment doctrine
concerning speech discrimination than those theories that suggest a general
norm of government impartiality or an undistorted speech market.
Part I of this article describes two competing views of the freedom of
speech, as well as the trend toward recognizing the freedom of speech as an
anti-discrimination principle. Part II explores definitional problems in the
modern rule against content-based regulation. Part III explores exceptions and
limitations to the rule. Part IV discusses leading theories of why content-based
regulations are disfavored, and proposes an alternative framework based on the
limitations of judicial review, political accountability, and the overarching goal
of preserving plentiful means of expression for all people.
I.

Two

COMPETING FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES

Laws that Restrict Too Much Speech and Laws that Do Not Restrict
Enough

A.

The current structure of First Amendment doctrine suggests, at least on the
surface, that there are two conflicting values inherent in the freedom of speech.
First is the value of preserving broad and meaningful opportunities for private
speech of all types, or, in other words, maximizing the quantity and variety of
speech in society. Second is the value of ensuring relative equality between
different kinds of speech, or, in other words, avoiding speech discrimination.
The first value, which we might call the speech maximizing value, is rooted
in several leading theories underlying the freedom of speech. These theories
include that the freedom of speech aims to further society's search for
16
15
knowledge, 14 to facilitate self-government, to check abusive government,

14

See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); JOHN

STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 2 (1859); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for

1108

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1103

and to allow individual fulfillment through self-expression. 17 All of these aims
are best served by a legal system that allows broad, meaningful speaking
opportunities for speakers of differing perspectives on all topics, including
perspectives that are potentially offensive or harmful.
Of course, the value of maximizing speech opportunities is outweighed in
some situations by other legitimate social values. For example, it may make
more sense for the government to build a police station, rather than a public
forum, on a certain parcel of land - a decision which may adversely affect the
Additionally, some messages or forms of
quantity of public speech.
communication might also be deemed so harmful and valueless that they may
be prohibited, such as physical threats or false advertising. 18 According to the
speech-maximizing value, however, all speech restrictions impose potential
informational costs. A primary goal of First Amendment doctrine, therefore, is
to achieve a reasonable balance between the value of speech and other social
interests. Within this balancing framework, the broader the speech restriction
(and the more kinds of speech it prevents) the greater the potential
informational cost.
The second potential First Amendment value, the anti-discrimination value,
is independent of the first: It regards selective speech restrictions as worse than
total speech restrictions, even though selective restrictions often allow more
speech than generally applicable restrictions. According to this value, the
particular problem with a law that restricts only some kinds of speech is the
relative inequality it creates between two kinds of messages that are important
for society to consider. 19 For example, a law that allows pro-war speech but
not anti-war speech on a particular parcel of government-owned land would
create an unequal playing field between two competing ideas. The disparity
would be solved either by allowing all speech at the given location or by
restricting all speech. According to the anti-discrimination value, it does not
matter whether a government is tolerant or intolerant toward speech, only that
it is equally tolerant or intolerant toward all kinds of speech. While the antidiscrimination value might find some explanation in the same theories that
underlie the speech-maximizing value, 20 advocates for it tend to stress different
Truth as a FirstAmendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1995).
15 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT

26 (1948); CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE

SPEECH 17 (1993).
16 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521, 527 (1977).
17 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593
(1982) (arguing that freedom of speech ultimately serves only one value - individual selfrealization).
"s See infra Part III.H.
19 Alexander, supra note 10, at 939.
20 For example, one might argue that speech discrimination "mutilate[es] the thinking
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These include the importance of preventing
First Amendment goals.
government from skewing or distorting public debate, of preventing
government-imposed orthodoxy or thought-control, and of preventing
government from acting with certain illegitimate ideological motives. 21
Modem First Amendment doctrine is commonly understood as relying upon
both of these independent values.22 This is the conventional way to understand
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral speech restrictions.
As the Supreme Court has said, a law might be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment because it "prohibits too much protected speech," 23 or it might be
unconstitutional because it "restricts too little speech. '24 A law that restricts
too much speech is unconstitutional, regardless of whether it discriminates
among different kinds of messages, because it unduly burdens the ability of
citizens to express potentially valuable messages to others.25 A law that
restricts too little speech, on the other hand, is unconstitutional because it
contains impermissible exceptions, thus putting some messages in a preferred
position ahead of other messages. 26 Supposedly, such a law would be
constitutionally improved if the exceptions were eliminated and all speech was
27
uniformly restricted.
Putting these elements together, one might describe current freedom of
speech doctrine as involving two zones of protection: one for core speech
rights that cannot be reduced, whether or not the government restricts all
speech equally; and another zone of protection for additional means of
communication, whose protection depends upon whether the government has
equally restricted other kinds of speech. The relationship between these zones
is shown in the following graphic:

process of the community" in a way that harms the process of self-governance or the
marketplace of ideas. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 15, at 26.
21For discussion of these theories, see infra text accompanying notes 82-95.
22 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 10, at 197-233.
23 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994).
24 Id.

25See id. at 53.
26Id. at 51.
27 See id. at 50-51.
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Two Potential Zones of Speech Protection
Maximum Speech

Non-DiscriminationZone

Toleration

Comparative Speech
Rights
Example: Picketing near a
public school entrance.

Mi

S

MnmmSpeech

Strict Protection Zone
Core Speech Rights
Example: Speaking and
leafleting on a major city
sidewalk.

Toleration Required
by First Amendment

r
Speech
A

Speech
B

Speech
C

Zero Speech
Toleration

The key to this drawing is the line in the center, which represents the
minimum speech opportunities that the Constitution guarantees to all speakers.
This delineates the zone of strict protection, defined not so much by message
but by the method of speech. Government may not restrict expressive
opportunities below this line, even if it restricts the expression of all messages
equally. The line reflects that while no person has a right to communicate in
every manner or place of his or her choosing, the First Amendment requires, at
the least, that the government allow citizens sufficient means and places in
which to express themselves, in order to ensure a society in which speech is
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 28 Below this line, each speaker's
29
freedom of speech is independent and fixed.
Speech rights in the strict protection zone are protected by the doctrinal
standard that applies in cases of content-neutral speech regulations. According
to the Supreme Court, any restriction on speech (even a content-neutral
restriction) is unconstitutional unless it is "narrowly tailored to serve a
28 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
29 Core expressive freedoms, as protected in this zone, are sometimes more accurately
described in general terms rather than by reference to specific expressive opportunities. For
example, the right to distribute literature on a specific sidewalk at a specific time is not
always protected, but may be affected by reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.
However, the right to some meaningful opportunity to distribute literature to the public in
person is fundamentally guaranteed by the freedom of speech, so that even private property
laws cannot operate to prevent it. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946)
(holding that a state may not apply its trespass law in a way that would deprive speakers of
the freedom to distribute literature in a company-owned town).
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significant governmental interest, and leave[s] open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information. '30 In applying this standard, the
Supreme Court has been especially protective of traditional means of
expression (such as vocal and written speech), of speech in traditional public
forums (including public sidewalks and parks), 31 of speech at home or
involving the home, 32 and it has disfavored laws that "foreclose an entire
medium of expression." 33 Thus, the Supreme Court has found protected a
person's right to distribute leaflets on city sidewalks, 34 to go door-to-door in
support of a message,35 to place signs expressing political viewpoints at one's
residence, 36 and to associate selectively with others for purposes of furthering a
common expressive cause 37 - even in the absence of content discrimination.
Presumably, the Court would also find protected a person's right to send and
receive mail, to use the telephone, to use the internet, and to speak vocally in
certain places. Fundamental speech rights such as these do not depend upon
whether the relevant restriction is content-based.
Additional speaking rights are depicted above the line; this is the nondiscrimination zone. In this zone, a person's freedom of speech is also
protected, but in a different way. Here, government may curtail speech rights
of various speakers partially or completely, as long as it restricts all speech
equally. Whether a speaker of message A has a right to make use of a forum
or means of communication in this zone, therefore, depends upon whether the
government has also restricted messages B and C to the same extent. In this
zone, the First Amendment operates as a non-discrimination rule.
Speech rights in the non-discrimination zone are protected only by the
standard that the Supreme Court applies to content-based restrictions. Laws
that impose different speech restrictions depending on the content of speech
are constitutional only if they are "narrowly tailored to promote a compelling

30

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).

31 See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (holding that a statute that

did not allow protestors to distribute leaflets in front of the Supreme Court building was
unconstitutional when applied to sidewalks); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165
(1939) (allowing a person to distribute materials on a city street without a permit).
32 Ladue, 512 U.S. at 58 (holding a sign ordinance unconstitutional); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406, 409 (1974) (invalidating a statute that outlawed a
homeowner from displaying a United States flag upside down in his window).
33 See Ladue, 512 U.S. at 55.
14 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939).
35 Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of N.Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
166 (2002) (finding it constitutionally offensive that a "citizen must first inform the
government of her desire to speak with her neighbors").
36 Ladue, 512 U.S. at 54-59.
37 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts
have a First Amendment right to discriminate against gay men in selecting scoutmasters).
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Government interest. ' 38 As this standard is more rigorous than the standard for
content-neutral regulations, it accordingly protects a broader range of
expressive opportunities. Protected speech opportunities in this zone might
include, for example, a speaker's interest in placing signs on governmentowned telephone poles, in distributing leaflets at a military base, in using a
megaphone in a residential neighborhood, or in picketing near the entrance of a
public school. While no speaker has a strict right to express a message in these
specific ways, 39 if the government allows such a privilege for one message, the
First Amendment presumptively requires it to permit other messages to the
40
same extent.
This framework is admittedly a simplification of First Amendment doctrine.
Courts do not usually begin a case by asking whether the particular speaking
opportunity is fundamental or not; a court's first inquiry is usually whether the
regulation is content-based. Courts will often find a content-based restriction
unconstitutional without inquiring as to the importance of the speaking
opportunity. 41 Indeed, the line in the center of the chart, separating
fundamental speech rights from those that depend upon non-discrimination, is
exceedingly difficult to locate in practice; it is therefore more of a theoretical
boundary than a decision-making device. Moreover, there are some categories
of harmful speech (such as child pornography) that are entitled to no means of
expression whatsoever, and some categories of speech that are entitled to less
protection than other speech. 42 The location of the center boundary, therefore,
depends in some measure upon the content of the speech at issue.
This two-zone framework is also flawed in a more fundamental way. It
suggests that equality is an independent First Amendment concern - that a
person who admittedly has more expressive freedom than the constitutional
minimum may find additional Sprotection if the government treats some
messages differently than others. In Part IV, I offer a different framework,
one based solely on the value of maximizing and broadening speech
opportunities. 4 4 Indeed, it is precisely the difficulty of locating the center
boundary in the context of judicial review that best explains heightened

38 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).

e.g., Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817
(1984) (upholding ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (upholding speech restrictions at military base).
40 Vincent, 466 U.S. at 816 (stating that crafting an exception for one category of speech
would risk impermissible speech discrimination).
41 See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971) (striking down law
due to content discrimination, without evaluating importance or necessity of speaking
opportunity).
42 See infra Part III.H.
43 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 10, at 190-194.
31 See,

44 See infra Part IV.D, including graphic onp. 1165.
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scrutiny for content discrimination; it is not that anti-discrimination serves a
purpose independent of maximizing speech.
Assuming for the moment that avoiding speech discrimination and
preserving meaningful speech opportunities are indeed separate and competing
values, this framework seems to reconcile them.
B.

The Conflict Between the Speech Maximizing and Anti-Discrimination
Values

In some situations, the goals of preserving meaningful expressive
opportunities and of avoiding speech discrimination are consistent, even
complimentary. For example, a law prohibiting all speech critical of the
government would clearly violate both principles: it would violate the first by
disallowing adequate means of expression for some potentially valuable
messages, and it would violate the second by singling out only speech "critical
of the government" for disfavored treatment. Moreover, a constitutional rule
forbidding the government from discriminating on the basis of content would
sometimes encourage the government to allow communication that it would
otherwise prohibit (rather than restrict speech that it favors), thus increasing
the total speech available to society. Such a rule would serve both the antidiscrimination and speech maximizing values.
The two values, however, are often in tension, both in practical application
and in theory. The Supreme Court's own description of speech-discriminatory
laws as those that "restrict too little speech" 45 captures part of this tension. In a
situation where government is required to tolerate all speech or none at all, it
will sometimes choose the latter - to allow no speech at all. Thus a
government might close a public forum entirely,46 eliminate a class of speech
subsidies, 47 or tighten restrictions on speech near schools or hospitals, 48 rather
45 City ofLadue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994).

46 This phenomenon occurs, for example, when government privatizes a public sidewalk
or park, or rededicates it to non-speech purposes. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113,
115-17 (2003) (describing Richmond's actions in closing a public forum to control drug
trafficking); Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1208-17
(D. Utah 2004) (describing Salt Lake City's decision to vacate a public easement over a
downtown plaza after litigation determined that the easement made the plaza a public
forum).
17In 1990, for example, some members of Congress proposed to eliminate the National
Endowment for the Arts altogether after two offensive NEA-funded works stirred a public
controversy. See NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1998) (discussing the Crane
Amendment, which would have "virtually eliminated the NEA"). It may be that the NEA
survived only because Congress decided instead to modify its funding criteria in a way that
disfavored offensive works. Id. Although the new standard plainly discriminated on the
basis of content, the Supreme Court upheld it in Finley. Id.at 580-90.
48 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding a restriction that prohibited "protest,
education or counseling" outside of medical buildings).
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than facilitate speech that many citizens find harmful or offensive. When this
happens, the value of avoiding speech discrimination is preserved only at the
expense of the value of maximizing speech opportunities. In essence, the goal
of speech equality causes a reduction in speech rights for everyone. If speech
maximization were the First Amendment's primary value, we would do better
in some settings to allow government to discriminate among messages, rather
than encouraging it to prohibit all speech simply to avoid some objectionable
speech.
The two principles also conflict at a more fundamental level. In order to
give meaning to the First Amendment principle that citizens are entitled to
plentiful means of expression for their ideas, courts and other government
officers must necessarily make judgments that evaluate and distinguish among
different kinds of speech. The very process of weighing the value of speech
against other societal interests, or of deciding whether the availability of one
means of expression is sufficient to allow the government to restrict another
means of expression, inevitably entangles government officials (including
judges) in the process of preferring some kinds of expression over others. 49 If,
however, the First Amendment completely prohibits government from
discriminating among different kinds of expression, or from evaluating the
communicative effects of speech, there appears to be no principled way to
50
draw the line between protected expression and non-protected expression.
For example, in deciding what kinds of expression are protected by the
freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has shown a preference for traditional
forms of expression (including, most importantly, the spoken and written
word) over non-traditional forms. Thus, the Court has ruled that door-to-door
leafleting is a highly protected form of expression because of its usefulness to
the poor, its powerful persuasive effect, and the lengthy tradition supporting
it. 51 By contrast, the Court has not found document burning or sleeping in
parks (even as part of a clear demonstration of a political viewpoint) to be so
protected. 52 Some commentators have observed that the Court's jurisprudence
seems to protect high-brow art, such as painting or ballet, over low-brow
entertainment, such as bar-room dancing or cock-fighting. 53 The Court also

4' Thus, when the Supreme Court upheld various restrictions on campaign finance, based
on the potential for election speech to facilitate political corruption, Justice Kennedy
accused the majority of engaging in impermissible content discrimination. McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 328 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10 Larry Alexander demonstrates this inconsistency at length in Alexander, supra note
10, at 931-45.
5' Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943).
52 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 290-92 (1984) (sleeping in
park demonstration); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968) (draft card burning
demonstration).
53 See, e.g., Stanley Ingber, Judging Without Judgment: ConstitutionalIrrelevancies and
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seems to prefer traditional art to new or experimental expressive forms. 54
Similarly, the Supreme Court favors speech on "matters of public concern"
over speech on matters of trivial or private concern 55 - reserving for itself, of
course, the power to decide what speech is important to society. Finally, the
Court has identified several important categories of speech that are either
completely unprotected, or are less protected, because the speech is either too
56
harmful or too lacking in value to warrant full First Amendment protection.
These categories include commercial speech, obscenity, fighting words, fraud,
threats, and false defamatory statements, among others.
The practice of measuring the value of expression and weighing it against
other interests is not limited to the courts. Legislatures and executive agencies,
when they make use of the various categories and balancing tests that the
Supreme Court has established, also participate in this inherently
discriminatory process. Take, for example, a state that requires the disclosure
of information on product labeling, prohibits obscenity, or decides whether to
provide funding for a particular theatrical production. Through such laws, the
government is inherently evaluating speech and its communicative effects and
deciding what kinds of speech to favor or disfavor. The government's
activities are perfectly consistent with the goal of providing plentiful means of
expression (assuming that govemment officials give sufficient value to the
speech at issue); indeed, they are necessary to give meaning to that goal. Thus
such laws reasonably preserve the speech maximization value. However, the
same activities are difficult to reconcile with the First Amendment's antidiscrimination concern.
If the anti-discrimination principle rests on a core belief that government
should not evaluate the communicative effects of speech or discriminate
among messages, government can achieve this goal only by becoming
indifferent toward speech. This, however, would require giving up the goal of
ensuring adequate means of communication. 57 The value of ensuring plentiful
expressive opportunities and the value of avoiding speech discrimination are
therefore in tension, if not outright conflict. 58 If the current structure of First
the Demise of Dialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1473, 1643 (1994); see also Barnes v. Glen

Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 590 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
54 See EUGENE VOLOKH,

THE FIRST AMENDMENT:

PROBLEMS, CASES AND POLICY

366 (2001) (discussing such implications in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1964)).
55 See Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (plurality
opinion) ("We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
ARGUMENTS

importance. It is speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection."') (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776 (1978)).
56 See infra Part III.H.

57 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 944-48.
58 The degree of conflict depends upon how broadly one interprets the anti-
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Amendment law rests upon both of these values, each is necessarily
compromised by the other.
C.

The Trend Toward Anti-Discrimination

If the two values discussed above are in competition, then it is a competition
in which the anti-discrimination value has been gaining ground. Over the past
several decades, Supreme Court Justices and scholars have increasingly
described the freedom of speech in anti-discrimination terms rather than in
value-of-speech terms. 59 Sometimes, these commentators even criticize the
60
process of categorizing and balancing speech as constitutionally problematic.
Whereas balancing and categorizing used to be the primary mode of First
Amendment analysis, with the conscious aim of promoting valuable public
speech, now achieving an unbiased government is offered as a competing First
Amendment value, possibly even the dominant value. Accordingly, the rule
against content discrimination today is often emphasized and made to do the
bulk of the First Amendment's work, while the rule that government must
ensure adequate means of expression is often regarded as weak and possibly
even constitutionally illegitimate.
The trend in Supreme Court cases began several decades ago. Prior to 1970,
Supreme Court cases concerning the freedom of speech evinced little concern
about speech discrimination. Although early isolated cases appeared to rest on
an underlying problem of viewpoint discrimination or religious
discrimination, 6 1 there existed no clear rule or presumption against speech
discrimination in general. Even in cases that could have been decided on antidiscrimination grounds, the Supreme Court typically explained in other terms,
such as overbreadth. 62 During this era, the Supreme Court regularly evaluated
whether the speech in question (or category of speech in question) would
contribute to the marketplace of ideas, whether it would injure the public
interest, and whether it properly struck the balance between speech's potential
discrimination principle. If the anti-discrimination principle prohibits only viewpoint
discrimination on the part of government, then only some of the distinctions discussed
above conflict with this principle. If, however, there is something illegitimate about
government preferring certain expressive formats over others (such as preferring high-brow
art over low-brow entertainment), then the conflict runs far deeper.
'9 See infra text accompanying notes 68-79.
60 E.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 779-81 (criticizing the use of balancing tests in First
Amendment law).
61 E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-558 (1965) (observing that unfettered
discretion on the part of officials would allow them to favor some viewpoints over others);
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953) (finding religious discrimination in public
park restrictions).
62 E.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1968) (holding that Ohio
syndicalism statute is overbroad in that it punishes mere advocacy, and not simply
incitement).
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value and speech's potential harm. 63 Thus, not only did the Court allow other
branches to engage in speech discrimination, but its own decisions also
reflected a process of speech discrimination.
In the early 1970s, however, the Supreme Court began to focus more
directly on speech discrimination as an independent wrong. In Schacht v.
United States,64 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal law
allowing civilians to wear military uniforms in theatrical and movie
productions, provided that the portrayal did not "tend to discredit" the
military. 65 The Supreme Court held that although the government could have
constitutionally prohibited all wearing of military uniforms by civilians,
nonetheless Congress could not selectively allow the use of uniforms for
expressive purposes according to the message conveyed. 66 The following year,
in Cohen v. California,67 the Supreme Court went further by protecting a
speaker's choice of offensive words directed to the public, referring to "the
usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form or content of
'68
individual expression.
The most influential early speech discrimination case, however, is Police
Department of Chicago v. Moseley.69
In Moseley, the Court held
unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited picketing near public
schools. 70 The constitutional flaw with the ordinance, according to the Court,
was not that it unduly burdened the speech of picketers, but rather that it
allowed an exception for labor picketing in the same zone, thus "describ[ing]

63 For example, in New York Times v. Sullivan, the Court explicitly relied upon policy

observations, including the value of speech regarding public figures on matters of public
concern, and the chilling effects of libel law, to support broad (although not unlimited)
protection of speech that falsely defames public figures. 376 U.S. 254, 269-83 (1964); see
also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (recognizing certain

categories of speech that "are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality").
64 398 U.S. 58 (1970).
65 Id. at 60 (quoting 10 U.S.C.
66 See id. at 61-63.
67

§ 772(f)) (2000).

403 U.S. 15 (1971).

68 Id. at 24. The State convicted Cohen for "offensive conduct" based on his having
walked through a public courthouse corridor wearing a jacket inscribed with the words,
"Fuck the Draft." Id. at 16. One might describe Cohen's First Amendment victory as an
undue burden case (on the grounds that no other words could adequately describe Cohen's
feelings about the draft), but it is more often cited for the principle that government may not
selectively punish certain speech solely because it is offensive. E.g., Carey v. Population
Servs., Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,
208-11 (1975).
69 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
70 Id. at 94.
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permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter. '7 1 Moseley is remarkable
for its rhetoric as much as for its extension of the principle barring speech
discrimination to subject-matter classifications. With emphatic words, the
Court declared that imposing differing restrictions based on the topic of speech
is wholly incompatible with the First Amendment:
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.... The essence of... forbidden censorship is
content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its
content would completely undercut the "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
'72
and wide-open.
The Moseley Court further emphasized that in a public forum the First
Amendment requires "an equality of status in the field of ideas," 73 suggesting
that government impartiality toward private opinions is a core element of the
freedom of speech, if not its primary value.
Since Moseley, the Supreme Court has continued to emphasize equality and
non-discrimination in many of its freedom of speech cases, 74 often quoting
Moseley's strong rhetoric, and emphasizing the importance of government
71 Id. at

95.

72 Id. at 95-96 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (citations

omitted).
71Id. at

96

(quoting

ALEXANDER

MEIKLEJOHN,

POLITICAL

FREEDOM:

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).

74 Significant decisions relying on the anti-discrimination principle include, among
others, Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2004) (upholding preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act); Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding unconstitutional restriction speech by candidates
for judicial office); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)
(holding unconstitutional federal anti-bleed restrictions on indecent cable television
programs); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995) (holding
unconstitutional a university's selective funding of student publications); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a law that punishes racist
fighting words but not all fighting words); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding unconstitutional a law that penalizes

publications by former criminals about their criminal activity); Sable Commc'ns of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 117 (1989) (holding unconstitutional restrictions on dial-a-por
telephone services); Ark. Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 (1987) (holding
unconstitutional selective tax exemption for certain publication subjects); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 459 (1980) (holding unconstitutional a selective restriction on sidewalk
picketing); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544-45 (1980)
(holding unconstitutional the selective restriction of utility bill inserts on controversial
topics); and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208-11 (1975) (holding
unconstitutional a law that selectively prohibits nudity at drive-in theatres).
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neutrality toward speech and the marketplace of ideas. 75 It is possible that this
has affected even the Court's own willingness to engage openly in speech
discrimination. In contrast to the pre-1970 era, the Court has often been
hesitant to mention balancing in its opinions (particularly when it is the value
of speech that is being weighed), and the Court seems reluctant to find new
categories of unprotected speech based on explicit policy analysis. Justices
Scalia and Kennedy have been particularly vigilant (if somewhat inconsistent)
in promoting the anti-discrimination method of free speech analysis, while
suggesting that the Court should move further in this direction. 76 For example,
Justice Scalia has suggested that in cases involving expressive conduct, the
freedom of speech doctrine should mirror the anti-discrimination doctrine that
77
he prescribed for the freedom of religion in Employment Division v. Smith.
In other words, he advocates eliminating the practice of judicial weighing of

expressive interests altogether, rendering all generally applicable laws
constitutional so long as they do not discriminate against expressive conduct
on the basis of message. 78 Justice Kennedy has further argued that it is unwise
for the Court to recognize any compelling interest exception to the rule against

75 For example, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., the Court
explained:
When a student first encounters our free speech jurisprudence, he or she might think it
is influenced by the philosophy that one idea is as good as any other, and that in art and
literature objective standards of style, taste, decorum, beauty, and esthetics are deemed
by the Constitution to be inappropriate, indeed unattainable. Quite the opposite is
true .... What the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to
make, not for Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.
Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this
revolution if we assume the Government is best positioned to make these choices for
us.

529 U.S. at 818. See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 ("It is axiomatic that the
government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it
conveys."); Ark. Writers' Project, 481 U.S. at 230 ("Regulations which permit the
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated
under the First Amendment.") (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 649 (1983));
Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 ("[Wlhen the government, acting as censor, undertakes
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more
offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power.").
76 For example, Justice Kennedy or Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in each
of the first five cases cited supra note 74, including significant opinions in R.A. V v. St. Paul
and Rosenberger v. Rector of University of Virginia. Many of these Justices' concurring
and dissenting opinions also emphasize the theme of speech neutrality or content neutrality,
typically more so than the opinions of other Justices.
77 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause generally does not
require special religious accommodations for laws of general application, no matter how
burdensome to religion).
78 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 576-79 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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speech discrimination. He would instead find all speech-discriminatory laws
unconstitutional per se, except for those that fall within historically established
exceptions. 79
As further indication of the shift in emphasis, in modem speech cases the
Supreme Court usually asks first whether a law discriminates on the basis of
If the law is content-based, then the Court proceeds to apply strict
content.
scrutiny, and usually finds the law unconstitutional. Only if a law is contentneutral will the Court typically ask whether it leaves the speaker adequate
means of communication. 81
Current freedom of speech scholarship appears to be pressing in a similar
direction, toward stronger recognition of the anti-discrimination value and
away from consciously promoting the value of speech. Larry Alexander, for
example, argues that "the First Amendment expresses as its primary value that
government not preempt individuals' evaluations of information... by
privileging certain evaluations." 82 In other words, as Alexander explains,
government (including judges) should never make a judgment that speech has
value, lacks value, or would cause positive or negative communicative
effects.8 3 He concludes, among other things, that courts violate this principle
when they evaluate the constitutionality of content-neutral laws, and that they
84
should drop this line of First Amendment analysis altogether.
Similarly, Elena Kagan has written a detailed work claiming that "First
Amendment law.., has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery
of improper governmental motives. ' 85 Central to her analysis is the claim that
it is categorically improper for government to regulate speech with a motive of
advancing ideas that the government believes are right or true ahead of other
ideas that the government believes are wrong or false. 86 Based on this
definition of improper motive, Kagan describes the bulk of First Amendment
law (including the content-neutral/content-based distinction) as seeking to
preserve an unbiased decision-making process on the part of government,

7' Republican Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 792-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Simon &

Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 124-28 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

11One notable exception is Ladue v. Gilleo, in which the Court found unconstitutional a
city ordinance restricting signs, on the basis that the law unduly burdened political speech
regardless of content discrimination. 512 U.S. 43, 53 (1994). The Court consciously
avoided the question of whether certain exceptions in the ordinance made it a content-based
regulation. Id.; but see id. at 59-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court
should have addressed the content discrimination question first).
82 Alexander, supra note 10, at 939.
83Id. at 945-48.
84 Id. at 945.

85Kagan, supra note 10, at 414.
86 Id. at 428-32.
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opportunities for speakers or
rather than as either protecting expressive
87
allowing speech for the benefit of audiences.
In this same vein, Jed Rubenfeld has recently proposed an overarching
88
His article, like
theory of the freedom of speech called "purposivism."
Alexander and Kagan's works, focuses the constitutional inquiry on the
government's reasons for regulating speech, rather than on whether a law
unduly burdens speech. 89 Taking guidance from the Supreme Court's freedom
of religion jurisprudence, Rubenfeld argues that all laws that restrict speech for
the purpose of suppressing opinion should be categorically unconstitutional,
and that all laws not infected with such a purpose are consistent with the
90
freedom of speech, no matter how much they happen to burden expression.
According to Rubenfeld, judges should never use balancing tests or cost91
benefit analyses to define the freedom of speech, nor should judges make
exceptions to what he calls the anti-orthodoxy principle of the First
Amendment. 92 Nor, contends Rubenfeld, does the First Amendment allow
speakers to violate generally applicable, speech-neutral laws in any
93
circumstances.
Other leading scholars, including Geoffrey Stone and Susan Williams, argue
that an important function of the freedom of speech is to prevent distortion of
the marketplace of ideas, which occurs when the government regulates speech
in a way that favors some viewpoints over others (whether intentionally or
not).94 Although these scholars do not describe anti-distortion as the only First
Amendment value, their theories suggest that stricter and broader enforcement
of the rule against speech discrimination is in order, reaching even laws that
impose disparate impacts on the speech market, even if such laws are facially
95
neutral.
Thus, freedom of speech dialogue has evolved in the last thirty-five years
toward an emphasis on neutrality and equality, and away from an emphasis on

87

88
89
90

Id. at 443-505.
Rubenfeld, supra note 10, at 768.
id. at 769.
Id. at 769-70.

91 Id.
92

at 778-93.

Id. at 818-32.

93Id. at 778 ("When a person is prosecuted in the ordinary course for violating an
ordinary prohibitory law, he will have no First Amendment claim because he will not be
punished for his speaking, even if he was speaking (or trying to speak) through his illegal
conduct.").
94See Stone, supra note 10, at 198, 217-27; Williams, supranote 10, at 672-79.
95See Stone, supra note 10, at 217-27 (discussing how de facto discriminatory effects of
content-neutral regulations play a legitimate role in First Amendment analysis); Williams,
supra note 10, at 672-79; id. at 710-19 (proposing that strict scrutiny should apply to laws
that impose disparate impacts on the speech market).
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protecting speech primarily for the information it provides. Some leading
96
scholars are pressing for the doctrine to move even farther in this direction.
Of course, there are counter-examples, and it would be an exaggeration to say
that anti-discrimination theories now control the freedom of speech. Indeed,
there remain large areas of First Amendment law that do not match, even
closely, the rhetoric just described. 97 Additionally, there remain scholars who
would interpret the freedom of speech in the traditional manner: by assessing
the potential costs and benefits of different categories of speech, and by
assessing whether a government's laws unduly restrict the flow of
information. 98 It appears, nonetheless, that traditional First Amendment
analysis is under assault like never before, in part due to an overly aggressive
reading of the supposed principle that the First Amendment prohibits content
discrimination. If we understand the limited scope of this principle and the
legitimate reasons behind it, we may avoid making some costly mistakes in
interpreting the First Amendment.
II.

PROBLEMS DEFINING SPEECH DISCRIMINATION

The Supreme Court has said: "It is axiomatic that the government may not
regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys." 99
This principle of constitutional law, though often exaggerated, has had
profound influence. Nevertheless, the principle is more difficult to apply than
it may initially appear. As the Supreme Court has stated more than once,
"[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral
is not always a simple task."' 0 0 Indeed, even after more than three decades of
applying the distinction, significant questions remain in the legal definition of
content-based regulation. This section explores some of those questions, and
suggests that they cannot be resolved sensibly without understanding why the
Constitution sometimes disfavors content discrimination.
Whether a law is content-based for First Amendment purposes depends
upon two primary questions. First, what aspects of speech are included within
the meaning of "content"? Second, in what manner (motive or effect) is the
government forbidden to discriminate?
Each of these questions raises
significant unresolved issues.

See, e.g., Williams, supra note 10, at 710-19.
17See infra Part Ill.
96

98See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment
Analysis, 54 STAN. L. REv. 737 (2002) (proposing a cost-benefit approach to First
Amendment interpretation).
99Rosenburger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995).
100 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)).
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Elements of Speech

A.
1.

Viewpoint and Subject Matter

The clearest example of impermissible
Schacht v. United States,'0 when the
viewpoints on a given topic for disfavored
any bedrock principle underlying the

speech discrimination occurs, as in
government selects one or more
treatment under the law. "If there is
First Amendment, it is that the

government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."' 02 The rule against viewpoint
discrimination even applies to government subsidies for speech, 0 3 unless the
government makes clear that its purpose in providing a subsidy is to promote a
particular point of view, 10 4 or unless the discrimination occurs in the context of
a government program or function that inherently involves viewpoint
discrimination. 0 5 Putting aside these curious exceptions, the rule against
viewpoint discrimination is a clear and powerful one, protecting even seditious
06
and dangerous messages.1
The concept of content-based discrimination also clearly encompasses
regulation on the basis of subject matter. 10 7 Although some writers have
questioned whether subject-matter classifications should warrant the same
scrutiny as viewpoint discrimination, 0 8 the Supreme Court has never overruled
the line of authority disfavoring subject-matter classifications, and the Court
continues to hold many such laws unconstitutional under the standard of strict
scrutiny. 09

101 398 U.S. 58 (1970); see supra text accompanying notes 64-66 (recounting how

Schacht prohibited the government from allowing civilian use of military uniforms for
selective purposes according to the message conveyed).
102 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
103 See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 544 (2001) (invalidating
requirement that legal aid groups who receive specified government funds cannot represent
clients seeking to change welfare laws); Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 837 (1995) (concluding that public university's refusal to pay publication costs for
religiously-oriented school newspaper violated viewpoint discrimination norms of the First
Amendment).
'04 See infra Part III.A.
105 See infra notes 199 and 294.
106 E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a law
banning flag desecration on the basis that it is viewpoint-discriminatory).
107 Police Dep't of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
108 See, e.g., Paul Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination,68 VA. L.
REV. 203, 251 (1982); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544-45
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
109 E.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (holding
unconstitutional a rule restricting candidates for judicial office from discussing issues likely
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The rule against subject-matter classifications is, however, limited. Notably,
governments may create limited public forums and subsidy programs defined
on the basis of subject matter without having to prove a compelling
governmental interest. 110 Moreover, even where heightened scrutiny does
apply, the Supreme Court has appeared less rigorous in applying strict scrutiny
when the exclusion involves only a subject-matter classification, rather than a
viewpoint classification."1
2. Words, Images, Volume, Format
It is also established that certain components of communication, including a
speaker's choice of words, symbols, and images, are protected by the rule
against content discrimination. Consequently, the government engages in
content-based discrimination when it undertakes to punish the use of profanity,
to prohibit nudity at outdoor movie theatres, or to restrict sexual content on the
internet. 112 Although a speaker may be able to communicate his or her point of
view in other ways, the speaker's choice of how to communicate (at least in
these ways) is a protected element of the message, even in1 1situations
where the
3
manner of communication is likely to be highly offensive.
The Supreme Court, however, has limited this line of reasoning. The rule
against content discrimination does not extend to a speaker's choice of
expressive conduct, even though demonstrations are often a powerful way to
convey a message." 14 Moreover, the rule does not even apply to a speaker's
choice of volume, even though volume (like words and images) is a
fundamental element of expression, and is particularly useful for expressing
emotion. A regulation limiting a rock band to playing no louder than mezzo
piano in a public park, for example, is as much of a curtailment of the
performer's expressive abilities as a restriction on nudity in outdoor films or a
restriction on profanity in public, yet the former is considered contentto come before the courts); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding unconstitutional a penalty on books describing
certain crimes).
'10 See infra Part III.C.
...See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding a restriction on
political speech near polling places after applying strict scrutiny); Austin v. Mich. Chamber
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990) (upholding a restriction on political speech of
corporations).
112See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (profane utterances); Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975) (images of nudity at outdoor theatre);
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 879-80 (1997) (sexually explicit materials on the internet).
1" See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
114 See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984)
(holding that sleeping in park as part of demonstration against homelessness is not
protected); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 372 (1968) (ruling that burning draft
cards as a form of protest is not protected under the First Amendment).
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Of course, some limits on the concept of "content" are necessary to avoid
subjecting all speech restrictions to strict scrutiny. After all, there is
theoretically no limit to how a person might choose to express himself or
herself, especially in the world of performance art. But perhaps this fact
should cause us to question why certain elements of a speaker's choice about
how to communicate (as opposed to the choice of viewpoint or subject matter)
should be protected by strict scrutiny while other expressive choices are left
unprotected.
The Court's uncritical approach leaves many questions unresolved. For
example, would it be content discrimination for the government to prohibit
public nudity generally, while making an exception for theatrical and ballet
performances? Some have argued that such a distinction would constitute
improper content discrimination, as it would privilege certain artistic forms
over others.'1 6 One might respond, however, that this law would only
discriminate on the basis of speech format, rather than on the basis of
content. 17 Ultimately, whether the law discriminates in any sense that is
improper under the First Amendment is not obvious from the word "content,"
and should depend upon the reasons why content discrimination is sometimes
disfavored.
3. Audience Reaction or Interest
According to existing doctrine, laws that punish speech on the basis of
listeners' reactions are generally classified as content-based. Thus, the
Supreme has held unconstitutional laws that punish speech in breach of the
peace.

18

Likewise, in Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement,"t9 the Court

invalidated a law imposing a parade fee based on the anticipated cost of
security, holding that20"[Ijisteners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral
basis for regulation." 1

115See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) (holding a restriction on
volume of outdoor music concerts to be content-neutral).
116 See, e.g., Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1098 (1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Indiana statute with its judge-made exception for 'expressive' nudity
discriminates between upper-class and lower-class non-obscene erotica.
The First
Amendment forbids this kind of discrimination."), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991).
117 See, e.g., Barnes, 498 U.S. at 574 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am not sure that

theater versus nontheater represents a distinction based on content rather than format ....

).

See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 2 (1949).
119505 U.S. 123 (1992).
"

120 Id. at 135. See also Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988)
(protecting offensive speech against the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).

1126

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 85:1 103

One reason for treating listener-reaction laws as content-based is that they
effectively allow the public to punish less desirable speech. In practice, such
laws encourage speakers to censor their own speech on the basis of content,
even if the government's purpose is only to protect public order. Indeed,
restrictions based on audience reaction cause more than a disparate impact on
select viewpoints; they are legally triggered by the communicative effects of
speech. 12' Treating such laws as content-based therefore makes sense if we
accept that the prohibition against content discrimination has to do with
preventing laws that target the communicative impact of speech. If it is
improper for the government to burden the expression of certain viewpoints
that are likely to offend or persuade the public, it should be equally improper
for the government to punish speech based upon whether it actually does
offend or persuade the public.
At the same time, the Supreme Court's classification of audience-reaction
laws as content-based raises an interesting contrast with other lines of authority
that recognize a legitimate governmental interest in protecting unwilling
audiences. For example, in Hill v. Colorado,122 the Supreme Court found to be
content-neutral a restriction on sidewalk counseling near health clinics
triggered, in part, by whether the intended listener had consented to the speech
in question. 23 The Court found that the law was content-neutral, because its
purpose was to protect medical patients from unwanted speech.' 24 Hill
therefore seems to suggest that the offensiveness or value of a speaker's
message to the audience, as determined by the audience, is a content-neutral
basis for prohibiting speech.
Perhaps the best way to reconcile Hill and cases treating audience-reaction
laws as content-based is to distinguish between single-member audiences and
mass audiences: A law is impermissibly content-based if it is triggered by a
mass audience reaction, but it is not content-based if it is triggered by a single
listener's reaction.1 25 Although the distinction has nothing to do with the word
On this basis, Eugene Volokh argues persuasively that such laws should be classified
as "content-based as applied." See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally
Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the
UnchartedZones, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277, 1286-1287 (2005).
122 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
121

Id. at 734-735 (holding statute constitutional). Likewise, property laws and antiharassment laws empower individual listeners to silence speech that they do not want to
hear, including for reasons having to do with the communicative effects of speech. For
more on the captive-audience problem, see infra Part 11I.G.
124 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-20, 723-25.
125 By this reasoning, the tort action in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell might be classified
as content-neutral because it was triggered by the communicative effect on one listener.
The result is justifiable, however, even under the scrutiny applicable to content-neutral
regulations, on the grounds that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (as
applied in that case) unduly restricted the speaker's ability to criticize a public figure. 485
123
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"content," it finds support in underlying First Amendment concerns. When a
law allows an individual listener to avoid unwanted speech, there is generally
less harm to the marketplace of ideas (because uninterested listeners are less
likely to be persuaded), and a greater possibility that real harm (in the form of
individual harassment, loss of privacy, or waste of time) may be avoided. By
contrast, when a crowd of unwilling listeners is allowed to censor unwanted
speech for a group, it begins to appear indistinguishable in effect from a direct
government restriction based on viewpoint or subject matter.
4. Speech's Purpose or Mode
Hill v. Colorado also raises a problem of speech classifications based on the
speaker's general purpose. The Colorado statute in Hill applied only to
approaching others "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to,
displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with
such other person." 126 The Supreme Court held this to be a content-neutral
provision, despite the fact that the law singled out certain categories of speech
27
(protest, education, and counseling) for special restriction.(
In finding the law to be content-neutral, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the statute applied to all possible subjects (not just abortion, but also topics
such the environment, animal rights and religion), and that it was viewpointneutral. 1 28 But why should this be dispositive, given that one must necessarily
speech to determine if it constitutes
examine the content of a person's
"education, protest or counseling"? 129
Perhaps the most persuasive reason for Hill's classification of the Colorado
statute as content-neutral is the fact that the categories of speech it restricted
were defined quite broadly, according to the speaker's general purpose, and
broad classifications generally seem less troubling than narrow
classifications.' 30 As the Court noted, the statute "simply establishes a minor
U.S. 46 at 52 (upholding Hustler Magazine's right to publish offensive material, without

reference to content discrimination, on the basis that First Amendment freedoms require
adequate "breathing space").
126 Hill, 530 U.S. at 707 (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-122(3) (1999)).
127Id. By only requiring permission to approach a person for the purpose of protest,

education or counseling, the law implicitly allowed other forms of potentially annoying or
harassing speech near health care facilities, such as asking for money, selling a product,
making sexual advances, or asking for directions.
128 Id. at 723.
129 The Colorado Attorney General argued that the categories of "protest, education or
counseling" should be construed to mean "all communication" to avoid the problem of
content discrimination, but the Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide the case on this
basis. Id. at 720-21.
130 Part of the Court's opinion suggests such a rationale. See id. at 723 ("[A] statute that
restricts certain categories of speech only lends itself to invidious use if there is a significant
number of communications, raising the same problem that the statute was enacted to solve,
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place restriction on an extremely broad category of communications with
unwilling listeners." 131 If this is the basis, however, for holding the statute to
be content-neutral, it raises for future cases an extremely difficult question of
broad
degree. It might also cause one to question whether some sufficiently
132
subject-matter classifications should be considered content-neutral.
5. Information Source
Another puzzle in the definition of content-based regulations concerns
restrictions based on the source of information. Consider a provision in the
United States Code that prohibits the publication of information obtained by
illegal wiretaps,' 33 and which was the subject of dispute in Bartnicki v.
Vopper. 134 From the lawmaker's point of view, such a statute is obviously
content-neutral, for it applies to any and all information that comes in a
specified manner. But from the point of view of a publisher or broadcaster,
such a law is obviously content-based: It tells the speaker that it cannot publish
certain messages, although it can publish other messages. Moreover, the
government's reasons for imposing a restriction on intercepted
communications certainly concern the communicative impact of speech. We
might therefore conclude that such laws are content-based in application,
similar to audience-reaction laws.
The Supreme Court, however, concluded otherwise. In Bartnicki, the Court
found the federal wiretap statute to be a content-neutral law of general
applicability, in part by looking to its purpose, which was "to protect the
privacy of wire, electronic, and oral communications."1 35 According to the
Court, the protection of privacy is a content-neutral purpose even though it is
directly related to communicative impact, because it does not distinguish
among subjects or viewpoints' 36 This suggests a narrow definition of the
phrase "content-based," and implies that even laws designed to limit the
communicative impact of speech are content-neutral unless they distinguish
37
among subject or viewpoint. 1

that fall outside the statute's scope, while others fall inside.").
131Id.
132 Perhaps it should not be surprising that Hill seems to undermine the clarity of the
term "content-based," given that Justice Stevens, the author of the Court's opinion, has often
expressed disagreement with the Court's broad disfavoring of content-based regulations,
particularly with respect to subject-matter discrimination. See supra note 108.
' 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2000).
134 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
135 Id. at 526 (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
136 Id.
137 The Court went on to find the statute unconstitutional, even though it was contentneutral. Id. at 535. The ruling is consistent with New York Times Co. v. United States,
which upheld the New York Times's right to publish information obtained from secret
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Speaker-Based Discrimination

Closely related to the problem of content-based speech discrimination is the
problem of speaker discrimination. A public school's decision concerning who
may use its internal mail system, 138 a public television station's choice of who
may participate in a televised debate, 139 and the FCC's requirement that cable
television operators carry certain broadcast stations 140 all involve
discrimination among speakers, although not necessarily discrimination on the
basis of the speech's content. Of course, if the government formally selects
speakers on the basis of what they will say, or restricts what certain speakers
are allowed to say, then the actions also constitute content discrimination and
are subject to strict scrutiny.' 41 But what about cases in which the presence of
intentional content discrimination is less certain?
The Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that the First Amendment
disfavors discrimination among speakers in the same way that it disfavors
content-based regulation. 42 Accordingly, the Court has struck down laws that
give government officials unbridled discretion to license who is allowed to
speak on the streets, based on the mere possibility that such authority could be
used to distinguish among messages. 43 Similarly, in Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 144 the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a special tax on the press, even though it was contentneutral on its face and even though there was no evidence of a speech biased
motive, reasoning that such taxes could potentially become tools of content45
based censorship. 1
In other speaker discrimination cases, however, the Supreme Court has
shown far greater deference to government actors. In Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC,146 for example, the Court upheld federal requirements that

Pentagon documents that were stolen by a third party. 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
138 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
139 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
140 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (2000).
141 See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 682 (stating requirement of viewpoint neutrality in speaker
selection).
142 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (stating
that the First Amendment rule against content discrimination also means that "[i]n the realm
of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over
another"); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) ("[Tlhe concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ... ").
143 E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 450-52 (1938).
144 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
145 Id. at 584-85, 591-92.
146 512 U.S. 622 (1994).

1130

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1103

cable television operators carry the signal of local broadcast stations, holding
that speaker-based preferences require strict scrutiny only "when they reflect
the Government's preference for the substance of what the favored speakers
have to say."' 147 Remarkably, the Court found the requirement that cable
television operators carry broadcasters' signals to be content-neutral, even
though broadcast stations are themselves regulated as to content (and in some
cases subsidized as to content), and the explicit statutory purposes of the law
included the promotion of educational television, public television, and
48
programming diversity. 1
Accordingly, there appears to be no singular First Amendment approach to
speaker discrimination in relation to content discrimination. Whether speaker
discrimination is treated as content discrimination might be framed as a
question of governmental motive, whereby the more closely a speaker is
identified with a particular viewpoint the more likely a decision promoting or
disabling that speaker will be seen as an exercise of content discrimination.
But the level of deference courts are willing to accord to legislators in
resolving this question seems to vary widely according to the medium of
communication.
Modes of Discrimination

B.

The meaning of content-based regulation becomes even murkier when one
considers the role of governmental motive. Is forbidden content discrimination
ultimately a matter of underlying governmental motive? Of statutory language
alone? Or of some combination of the two? The Supreme Court has not fully
resolved these questions.
1.

The Question of Legislative Motive

It is fairly clear that a law is not content-based merely because it
disproportionately affects speakers of a particular viewpoint. For example, a
law restricting speech around abortion clinics may be content-neutral, even
though its primary effect is to limit the speech of abortion protestors, and even
149
if the government knew that this would be its primary effect.
In some cases, a disproportionate impact upon speakers of a particular
viewpoint may serve as powerful evidence that the government specifically
intended to burden speech of that viewpoint. 15 0 If one can prove that a law was
motivated by a viewpoint-biased purpose, this might suffice to classify the law
147 See
148 Id.;

id. at 657-59.
see also Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,

Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(6)-(8), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (1992).
149Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723-25 (2000).
'5'See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-8 (1990) (concluding that a

facially content-neutral restriction on flag burning can only be explained by reference to
content of speech).
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as content-based. 151 The likelihood of labeling a law as content discriminatory
depends upon whether, and to what extent, governmental motive is the
determining factor in defining content discrimination.
The Supreme Court has given conflicting guidance on the relevance of
legislative motive in measuring content discrimination. Sometimes the Court
has suggested that legislative purpose is the primary measure of contentneutrality.
The Court has emphasized that "[t]he principle inquiry in
determining content neutrality... is whether the government has adopted a
'152
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.
Accordingly, "government regulation of expressive activity is 'content-neutral'
if it isjustified without reference to the content of regulated speech[,]' J 53 even
if it facially discriminates according to content, as when government imposes
special zoning requirements for adult movie theatres. 154 Likewise, a facially
content-neutral regulation is sometimes deemed "content-based" if its apparent
purpose is to discriminate against an unpopular viewpoint, such as a law
55
prohibiting flag burning.1
At other times, the Supreme Court has suggested that content-neutrality is
measured solely by looking at the face of a statute or regulation.
Consequently, the Court has held that a facially content-based law will not be
excused or classified as content-neutral because it is supported by good
motives. 156 Nor will a facially content-neutral regulation be deemed contentdiscriminatory because of an apparent viewpoint-based motive, as when the
157
United States banned the burning of draft cards during the Vietnam War.
151Id. (holding a restriction on flag burning to be content-based in purpose).
152Hill, 530 U.S. at 719 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791

(1989)).

"IId. at 720 (emphasis added); see also id. at 720-22 (finding Colorado's regulation of
"protest, education or counseling" around medical buildings to be content-neutral, though
acknowledging that one must examine the speech's content to determine if it is covered by
the regulation).
154See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) (treating the
regulation of sexually oriented speech as content-neutral, because its purpose is to prevent
the secondary effects of such speech).
...See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315 (holding a restriction on flag-burning to be contentbased in purpose).
"56 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 117 (1991) ("[O]ur cases have consistently held that '[illlicit legislative intent is not the
sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment."') (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983)); see also Ark. Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1987) (striking down an Arkansas law
which imposed a tax on magazines); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 464-69 (1980).
151 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
a restriction on burning draft cards, despite indications that the law was purposely aimed at
anti-war speech, stating that "under settled principles the purpose of Congress ... is not a
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According to this standard, it is the text of a regulation, not the motive behind
it, that determines whether it is content-based.
Yet at other times, the Court has combined elements of both these standards,
suggesting that either a discriminatory motive or a facially discriminatory
classification will render a law content-based. Thus, the Supreme Court has
said, "[i]n determining whether a regulation is content based or content neutral,
we look to the purpose behind the regulation,"' 158 subject to the qualification
that
while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances
to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a
showing in all cases. ... Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral
purpose be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based
59
on content.1
In essence, the Supreme Court seems to reserve the right to apply either
definition of content-based regulation, and to make exceptions to either
definition, depending upon the circumstance.
It might be possible to reconcile some of the Court's cases by making fine
distinctions between different types of motives: official statutory motive versus
illicit governmental motive, 160 primary motive versus secondary motive,' 61 or
viewpoint-based motive versus a less troubling content-based motive. 62 In
this way, some of the tension between these apparently conflicting standards
might be explained. But I think it would be reading too much into the law to
reconcile all of the Supreme Court's cases into a singular framework based on
these types of distinctions. The law, quite simply, has not consistently
approached the issue of motive in speech discrimination cases, as most of the
current Justices have noticed, at one time or another.1 63 Perhaps the most
accurate way to describe the current doctrine, therefore, is to say that generally

basis for declaring ... legislation unconstitutional."); see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.,
529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000) (holding that the Court will not strike down a facially neutral
statute simply because of an alleged illicit motive).
158 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994) (noting that the principal factor in determining content
neutrality is the purpose behind the legislation).
159 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526 n.9 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 642-43) (emphasis
added).
160 See Erie, 529 U.S. at 292 (suggesting such a distinction).
161See id. (suggesting that the "predominate" purpose of the statute matters most in
determining the governmental interest); see also Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48.
162 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (suggesting that a viewpointdiscriminatory motive is more "obnoxious" than other content-based motives).
163 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 454-57 (Souter, J., dissenting); Hill, 530 U.S. at 741-49
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Turner, 512 U.S. at 676-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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a regulation of speech is content-based if it is justified by reference to speech
content, or if it facially discriminates on the basis of speech content, but that
the Supreme Court has occasionally found exceptions to both principles.
2. The Secondary Effects Doctrine
One important exception is worth further comment. It is the so-called
secondary effects doctrine, which the Court applied in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.164 In Renton, the Supreme Court found a city zoning
ordinance restricting the location of "adult motion picture theatres" to be
content-neutral, despite the fact that the ordinance plainly distinguished on its
face between theaters according to the content of their movies. 165 To classify it
as content-neutral, the Supreme Court relied upon the broader purpose of the
ordinance, which was to limit the secondary effects of sexually oriented
businesses (including crime and property value losses in nearby
166
neighborhoods), not to condemn the content of sexually explicit films.
Accordingly, Renton holds that when the government acts for the predominate
purpose of restraining the secondary effects of speech, it may single out certain
speech for disfavored treatment without invoking strict scrutiny. So far, the
Supreme Court has only applied the secondary effects doctrine to the
regulation of sexually explicit speech. 167
Commentators have criticized the secondary effects doctrine for various
reasons. Some argue that the secondary effects test allows government to
regulate speech based on hidden content-based motives. 168 Others argue that
the secondary effects doctrine weakens and obscures the contentbased/content-neutral distinction, and169 does not account for the distorting
effects of facially content-based laws.
My criticism of the secondary effects doctrine rests on another basis. It is
that the Supreme Court has not justified the doctrine's central premise - that it
is preferable for government to restrict speech based on its secondary effects
rather than to restrict speech based on its communicative effects. Indeed, by
excusing speech restrictions based on secondary effects, while condemning
speech restrictions based on communicative effects, the doctrine creates a

164 475 U.S. 41 (1986).

Id. at 47-49.
Id. Sexually oriented businesses are sometimes referred to as SOBs.
167 In addition to Renton, the Court applied the secondary effects doctrine in Alameda
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 433-443 (plurality opinion) (upholding regulation of adult
bookstores), and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 302 (2000) (upholding a nude
entertainment ordinance).
168 Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 454-57 (Souter, J., dissenting); Kagan, supra note 10, at
485,490.
169 Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 115-17
(1987).
165

166
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peculiar and unjustified distinction in the law.
An example shows the emptiness of this distinction. Suppose that there are
two kinds of non-speech conduct (X and Y) that the government considers
harmful to society, and that are closely associated with one another in practice.
(An example might be illegal drug use and prostitution.) The government
may, of course, prohibit people from doing X or doing Y, without any problem
under the First Amendment. But it would run into the First Amendment's rule
against content discrimination if it restricted speech advocating conduct X or
advocating conduct Y, even if such a restriction would be effective in reducing
the incidence of X or y. 1 70 This distinction makes sense because the First
Amendment protects speech (not conduct), and because a rule allowing
government to ban all speech encouraging illegal conduct would chill too
much potentially valuable speech.
Assume, however, that conduct X and conduct Y are so closely associated
that speech encouraging conduct X has the secondary effect of increasing
conduct Y, and that speech encouraging conduct Y has the secondary effect of
increasing conduct X. In this case, according to the secondary effects doctrine,
government may restrict speech advocating X or Y, as long as it only intends
the crossover secondary effects.
Here, then, is the problem. For constitutional purposes, the government has
a legitimate purpose in preventing conduct X and in preventing conduct Y.
Moreover, the secondary effects doctrine suggests that a legitimate means of
accomplishing these purposes is to restrict speech advocating X or Y - as long
as the purpose for restricting speech X is to reduce conduct Y, and the purpose
for restricting speech Y is to reduce conduct X. What could possibly support
such a rule? If neither the purpose of preventing conduct X nor the means of
restricting speech X is constitutionally troubling by itself, why should the First
Amendment prohibit the government from using the latter to accomplish the
former? On the other hand, if restricting speech is an inappropriate means of
preventing harmful conduct because valuable speech would be chilled, it
should make no difference whether the causal link between speech and conduct
is direct or indirect, communicative or non-communicative.
The secondary effects doctrine seems to be a contrived justification for
allowing governments to regulate sexually explicit speech more heavily than
other speech, without admitting that this is a content-based choice. We ought
to do away with it. I do not mean that the negative secondary effects of
sexually oriented businesses are imaginary, or that such effects are an
illegitimate basis for regulating speech. I am arguing, instead, that the fact that
certain effects are secondary harms, as opposed to primary communicative
harms, ought to be irrelevant in deciding whether, and to what extent, sexually
explicit speech (or any other kind of speech) is protected by the First

170 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (finding incitement ordinance

unconstitutional).
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Amendment. 171

The Supreme Court would be more candid to analyze the regulation of
sexually oriented businesses within a framework that classifies pornography as
low-value speech, 172 recognizing the potential harms that such speech causes to
society (including both primary and secondary effects). 173 This might lead to a
standard like the one we have today, which allows special zoning rules for
adult businesses, provided that the local government allows a reasonable place
for these businesses to locate. The advantage of this approach is that it would
not charade as a speech-neutral doctrine, as Renton does, and would lead to a
more principled legal evaluation. Whether or not one agrees with Renton and
its progeny, the Renton doctrine is better understood as an exception to the
First Amendment rule against content discrimination - based on the unique
aspects of sexually oriented businesses - rather than as a faithful application of
that rule.
In sum, the First Amendment rule against content-based discrimination
raises many definitional questions, many of which have yet to be resolved. It
is impossible to resolve these issues sensibly without a clear sense of why the
First Amendment disfavors content-based regulation. Before turning to this
issue, however, it is important to consider the many circumstances in which
government is admittedly allowed to engage in content-based discrimination.
171 The protection of property values is especially unpersuasive when offered as a

"content-neutral" reason for regulating SOBs. If SOBs tend to lower surrounding property
values, it is almost certainly because many people do not want to live or shop where they
will be exposed to offensive speech. For government to use this as a basis for regulating the
location of SOBs, therefore, is akin to regulating speech on the basis of audience reaction,
which courts have classified as a content-based criterion. See supra Part II.A.3. Certainly
the same argument would never succeed as justification for zoning on the basis of race
(even if one could prove that the presence of minorities in an area lowers property values)
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, and we should not pretend that it is a contentneutral justification for purposes of the First Amendment. If it is legal to regulate the
location of SOBs differently than other businesses, it must be because the First
Amendment's rule against content discrimination is more limited in scope and strength than
the Fourteenth Amendment's rule against racial discrimination.
172 See Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 795, 807-13 (1993)
(defending the position that pornography can be more heavily regulated than core First
Amendment speech because of its minimal value to public discourse and its high potential
for public harm); see also Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)
(plurality opinion) ("[F]ew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve
the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our
choice.").
173 Secondary effects include increased crime and loss of property values in
neighborhoods where such businesses exist. Primary communicative effects include
pornography addiction, psychological trauma to children, increased incidents of sexually
transmitted diseases, potential increases in violence against women, and offense. For
further discussion of pornography's harms, see Sunstein, supra note 172, at 809-12.
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Only in light of these exceptions can we accurately discern the reasoning
behind the content-based/content-neutral distinction.
III. PUZZLING EXCEPTIONS
It is often said that the exceptions to the First Amendment's rule against
content discrimination are "few"' 74 and "well-defined."' 175 I aim in this section
to present a different perspective. There are many areas of law and public
administration in which government actors regularly engage in content-based
speech discrimination for a variety of purposes and with far-reaching effects.
These might be described as exceptions to the rule against content
discrimination, or they might be described as areas in which the rule simply
does not apply. Either way, it is fair to say that government-imposed speech
discrimination is well accepted in our constitutional system.
The areas of permissible speech discrimination vary widely in their
justification and scope. Some are defined in terms of the medium of
communication; others in terms of the government's operation or purpose;
others in terms of the speech itself. In some fields of government activity,
there are essentially no restraints on speech discrimination; in others, strict
scrutiny is replaced with a more lenient set of First Amendment standards, thus
prohibiting some speech discrimination but allowing much as well. In some
areas, the standards of permissible speech discrimination are well defined; in
others, the standards are sketchy at best.
It is worth exploring these puzzling exceptions, not only because they
provide powerful clues as to the purposes of the First Amendment, but also
because courts and commentators have often ignored or minimized their role in
the analysis of content discrimination.
A.

Government-Supported Viewpoints

When the government acts openly to promote a message of its choice, it is
not subject to the rule against content discrimination. 176 The governmentspeech exception includes the use of government property and employees to
provide selective information to the public or to promote one side of a public
debate. It also includes the government's sponsorship of private speech by
giving money or special speaking privileges to those who would further the
government's point of view.1 7
For example, the United States may
174Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382-383 (1992), which in turn quotes Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
175 Id. at 358 (2003) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
176See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2001); Rosenberger v.

Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
177The United States has sponsored some of the most memorable viewpoint-based media
campaigns in American history through the Ad Council, a private public interest firm.
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commission a private artist to build a pro-veteran memorial in a prime location
of the Washington D.C. Mall; it may closely regulate the tone, subject matter,
message, and offensiveness of the monument; and it may deny anti-war artists
an equivalent opportunity to build their own monument in the park. Likewise,
a public school may invite an outside visitor to speak to its student body on a
topic such as drug use in a special assembly, and may choose the speaker based
upon his or her viewpoint. Indeed, government in many settings may easily
engage in what is thought to be the worst form of speech discrimination
178
intent.
its
is
this
that
clear
makes
it
as
long
as
discrimination
viewpoint
It is tempting to justify this gaping exception to the rule against speech
discrimination as a mere practical necessity of government. True, it is
impossible to administer any kind of government without speaking, and it is
impossible for any administration to speak without making content-based
choices. However, the practice of government speech extends well beyond
that which is necessary for government administration. There are whole
agencies and departments of government, as well as entire sections of the
United States Code, whose sole purpose is to influence the public on a variety
1 79
of topics ranging from tourism to science to politics to proper use of the flag.
Museums, schools, scientific agencies, public zoos, and many grant programs
(including the National Endowment for Democracy, 180 education grants to
encourage sexual abstinence among teenagers, 181 and the Drug Free Media
Campaign Act182) depend, in whole or in part, upon this broad exclusion from
the First Amendment's requirement of speech neutrality. These kinds of
government programs, and the censorship that occurs within them, are
premised upon the well-accepted idea that government can and should make a
positive difference in the world of ideas: Government is not merely an
adjudicator of public discourse; it is also an active participant in almost every
discussion of public importance. On many topics, and in many venues, it is the
83
most important participant.
These campaigns include "Buy War Bonds," "Rosy the Riveter," "Smokey Bear, "Friends
Don't Let Friends Drive Drunk," and the "War on Drugs". See Ad Council, Matters of
Choice, http://www.adcouncil.org/pdf/matters of choice.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).

178Of course, government may not entirely ban speech on the basis of viewpoint, nor
unduly restrict a disfavored viewpoint, no matter how clear its intent. But this limitation
arises not from the rule against content discrimination, but the more general principle
(applicable also to content-neutral regulations) that government may not deprive speakers of
an adequate means of expressing their views. See supra notes 30-37.
1' See 36 U.S.C. §§ 173-178 (2000) (governing the display and use of the U.S. flag).
180 22 U.S.C. § 4411 (b) (2000) (stating that the Endowment's purpose is to encourage
democracy abroad).

1 42 U.S.C. § 710 (2000) (providing a separate program for abstinence education).
18221 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (2000) (mandating a national advertising campaign to reduce
drug use among American youth).
183 For a thorough treatment of the government speech exception in First Amendment
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Nor can we justify this exception on the basis that government speech
merely adds to public discourse and does not take away from it. To the
contrary, the promotion of government viewpoints frequently entails
restrictions on private speech. When government dedicates a place, resource,
or program for the promotion of the government's official point of view, it
typically prohibits the use of that resource by anyone who would promote a
contrary point of view. For example, a public high school may, as part of its
gay and lesbian awareness month, set aside a bulletin board for teachers and
students to post articles promoting tolerance of gay lifestyles; it may
simultaneously punish a teacher who uses the board to post articles critical of
such lifestyles. 184 The practice of government-promoted speech, therefore,
allows the selective removal of disfavored viewpoints from public discourse in
certain forums, even if it does not allow their removal from public discourse
altogether. Were it not for the broader First Amendment principle that
government must allow speakers ample means of communication, nothing
(other than politics) would prevent government from dedicating all publicly
owned places and resources for the communication of solely governmentselected viewpoints.
B.

Public Education
In the realm of public education, ranging from pre-schools to state
universities and graduate schools, speech discrimination is both pervasive and
well accepted. On a daily basis, government educational institutions around
the nation control the speech content of millions of Americans in a variety of
ways: prescribing educational curriculum for the citizenry; imposing tests
measuring students' ability to say what is valued; teaching facts, theories, and
moral values selected by the government; imposing restrictions upon student
speech and upon teacher speech based on appropriateness and subject matter;
rewarding certain ways of thinking and speaking; sponsoring debates or panel
discussions among speakers whose viewpoints are carefully chosen; and
evaluating the scholarship and artistic works of faculty and students based on
merit. Certainly, the notion that the Constitution requires an "equality of status
in the field of ideas"'185 does not apply to public education. Even the most
open-minded state university must necessarily elevate some subjects,

analysis, including its many variations and potential abuses, see MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983);
see also Frederick Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 373, 380-

81 (1983) (arguing that the answer is "no," as long as private speakers retain adequate
expressive alternatives).
"84 See Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2000).
185 Police Dep't of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)

(quoting ALEXANDER

MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27

(1948)).
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viewpoints, and forms of expression above others. Otherwise, it would have
little reason to exist.
Much of the speech discrimination in public education may be fairly
described as government speech, and for this reason alone it is exempted from
the rule against content discrimination.' 86 But there are also many contentbased decisions made by public school administrators and teachers that do not
involve government-supported viewpoints, and yet are still exempted from
strict scrutiny. For example, a public high school may censor a student
newspaper article on the topic of teen pregnancy, for the purpose of avoiding
embarrassment to subjects of the article or because the topic is sensitive, if the
school treats the newspaper as an educational exercise. 187 Similarly, a school
may suspend a student for using offensive sexual innuendo during a school
assembly, even when it is clear that the student was speaking on his own
behalf. 188 A state university may promote or dismiss scholars depending upon
whether their published work is found to have substantial "merit," a
determination which necessarily involves content-based evaluations of speech
even if the government does not endorse any particular viewpoint related to a
scholar's work.
According to the Supreme Court, governments have greater freedom to
regulate the content of speech in the public educational context because the
purposes of public education require it. 189 One of these purposes is even to
teach students the proper manner of speaking: "Public education must prepare
pupils for citizenship in the Republic ... It must inculcate the habits and
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as
indispensable to the practice of self-government in the community and the
nation." 190 Accordingly, in its capacity as educator, government may censor
not only speech that would directly interfere with its work, but also speech that
or
is "ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased
191
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences."'
There are, of course, limits to government's ability to impose content-based
controls in public education. 192 Nonetheless, speech discrimination is

186

See discussion supra Part III.A.

1' Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
188 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
189 See Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 ("A school need not tolerate student speech that is
inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,' even though the government could not
censor similar speech outside the school.") (internal citation omitted); see also Fraser,478
U.S. at 681 (stating that the freedom to promote controversial views must be balanced
against the need for students to be taught socially appropriate behavior).
"0 Fraser,478 U.S. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASiC HISTORY OF THE
228 (1968)).
191Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.

UNITED STATES

192 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding
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generally permissible as long as it does not occur within a designated public
forum and is reasonably related to a legitimate educational objective. 193 In the
field of education, our society not only permits, but expects, government to
impose a variety of speech preferences reflecting society's orthodox views of
true and false, right and wrong, and accepted manners of speaking and
writing.
C.

94

Special Forums and Subsidies

Government may also dedicate its resources and facilities to promote speech
that it believes is good for society, even if it is not promoting a particular
viewpoint. It may establish programs or forums to encourage speech on
certain topics, speech that has artistic or literary merit, speech that has
scholarly merit, speech that serves a charitable purpose, or speech that provides
a useful perspective. When the government selectively promotes high quality
speech in this way, it necessarily engages in content discrimination and skews
public discourse. This kind of content discrimination is generally acceptable
as long as the speech classifications are reasonable and consistent with the
program's defined purpose. 195
unconstitutional a school board order requiring the removal of select books from school
libraries); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(upholding a student's right to wear an armband in protest of war, noting that students and
teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech at the schoolhouse
gate").
193Of course, this standard seems only to beg the question of what is a valid educational
objective. If the First Amendment requires the government to be neutral as to all ideas (as it
does with respect to religion) then the whole premise of public education is illegitimate. See
Alexander, supra note 10, at 953-54 (arguing that an inherent conflict exists between the
anti-orthodoxy principle of the First Amendment and public education). On the other hand,
if the government is given total deference to define its educational mission, then this
restriction has no bite. The Supreme Court has taken a vague middle course, applying
popular notions of what education is for, including the teaching of certain kinds of moral
values, but leaving room to find some educational purposes illegitimate. Compare Fraser,
478 U.S. at 680-81 (finding that teaching civility and avoiding offense are legitimate
educational objectives), with Pico, 457 U.S. at 872 (holding that "local school boards may
not remove books from school library shelves simply because they dislike the ideas
contained in those books and seek by their removal to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion') (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
114 For a powerful defense of government's role in teaching cultural and moral values in
public schools, see Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educatingfor Citizenship,
62 U. CHI. L. REv. 131, 157-82 (1995). Also, for a good explanation of why the Supreme
Court's famous statement in Barnette that government "may not prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion" should not be taken
literally, see Steven D. Smith, Bamette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-K. L. REv. 625 (2003).
"I See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
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Accordingly, the United States may selectively fund private art through the
196
National Endowment for the Arts on the basis of artistic merit and decency.
It may selectively subsidize family planning programs that do not engage in
abortion counseling. 197 It may selectively assist private solicitations for
charities. 198 Public libraries, government-owned television stations, educationbased subsidies, scientific grants, forums devoted to certain topics,
government-owned theatres and performing arts centers, and many other
speech-promoting government programs engage in this kind of speech
discrimination. Some of these merit-based programs even engage in viewpoint
discrimination. 99
While the Constitution does impose some limits on the government's ability
to selectively promote speech, 20 0 and while some content-based subsidies are
controversial, few would argue that government should have no role in
promoting art, literature, science and other valuable expression. Moreover, the
constitutional limits in this area appear to be more disclosure-oriented than
they are substantive. When it comes to the government's own spending and
use of its property, the First Amendment does not bar any particular kind of
speech discrimination (not even viewpoint discrimination), but rather serves
the purpose of making the government's speech-biased decisions more open to
20 1
the public.
Government Employment and Secrets

D.

First Amendment law also broadly permits content discrimination with
respect to public employment. Federal and state governments regularly impose
significant content-based restrictions on the speech of government employees,
often for reasons that would not suffice if the same restrictions were imposed
on others. These instances of speech discrimination are not subject to strict

("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker
identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the
forum and are viewpoint neutral.").
196 NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580-87 (1998).
197 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179-81 (1990).
"I Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811-13 (upholding executive order excluding legal defense
funds from charity drive in a federal government workplace).
199 Evaluations of scholarly and scientific merit, for example, necessarily include some
consideration of whether the speaker's viewpoint is reasonable. See also United States v.
Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206-08 (2003) (recognizing that public libraries must
enjoy discretion to discriminate among viewpoints); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v.
Forbes 523 U.S. 666, 673-75 (1998) (recognizing that public television stations must
necessarily make some viewpoint-based decisions when selecting programming, and that
generally such decisions do not violate the First Amendment).
200 See infra Part IV.D.2.
201

See id.
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scrutiny, but are only subject to a form of intermediate scrutiny.20 2 This lower
level of scrutiny even applies to restrictions on employees' private off-the-job
speech, 20 3 and allows the government to punish the disclosure of truthful
information that has been classified. 20 4 In some cases, the First Amendment
even permits the government to review and restrict the speech of former or
present employees prior to dissemination, contrary to the usual rule against
20 5
prior restraints.
It is tempting to justify more permissive treatment of content-based
employment rules solely on the basis of compelling governmental interests,
such as national security and privacy. But if the government can demonstrate
compelling interests that justify such content-based employment rules, then
strict scrutiny review would suffice. This theory, therefore, does not explain
why the Supreme Court applies a lower level of scrutiny to speech restrictions
in public employment. Moreover, under current law, governmental interests
that often support punishing a public employee's disclosure of information
restrict a
(including privacy and national security) are generally insufficient20to
6
non-employee's disclosure of information once it has been leaked.
This suggests that it is not solely the strength of the government's purpose
for controlling employee speech, or the nature of its motive, that justifies more
lenient standards in this context. The standard is also shaped by the fact that
public employees have voluntarily waived a portion of their First Amendment
freedoms: Those who want to avoid content-based restrictions may simply
decline public employment. The First Amendment, at least in this context,
reflects a primary concern with preserving an adequate range of expressive

202 According to the Supreme Court, government may restrict an employee's speech on a

matter of public concern if the government's interest outweighs the value of the speech to
the employee and to the public, considering the totality of circumstances. Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-154 (1982).
203 See U. S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)
(upholding restriction on government employees' participation in political campaigns).
204 In 1993 alone, the United States classified over 14 million documents for national
security reasons.
See INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 5 (2003). These are only a fraction of the total number of confidential records
and pieces of information that federal employees can be punished for revealing. For
examples of federal employee disclosure laws, which are scattered throughout the U.S.
Code, see 18 U.S.C. § 1902 (2000) (regarding crop information); id. at § 1905 (regarding
confidential information generally); id. at § 1906 (regarding bank information); and id. at §
1907 (regarding farm credit examiner reports).
205 See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980) (upholding the punishment of a
former CIA agent who failed to submit a book describing his CIA experience for prepublication review).
206 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718-19 (1971) (holding
unconstitutional an injunction against the publication of Pentagon secrets that were illegally
leaked to the press).

20051
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freedom for individual speakers based on the voluntary choices that they make,
and not with ensuring that the government's motives are neutral with respect to
speech.
Television and Radio

E.

Since almost the inception of broadcast communication, the Federal
Government has controlled the content of television and radio programming two of the most influential mediums of communication today - with the
approval of most Americans and of the Supreme Court. These content controls
take several forms. First, the FCC issues licenses to radio and television
broadcasters according to a public interest standard,20 7 which may include
examination of a broadcaster's programming content. 20 8 Second, the FCC may
fine radio and television broadcasters for indecent programming during
daytime hours, including programs containing profanity or sexually explicit
content. 209 Third, federal law reserves some licenses and bandwidths
specifically for educational programming, an obvious content-based
classification. 210 Fourth, federal law requires broadcasters to provide balanced
21
coverage of political elections through application of the fairness doctrine. '
Although these controls leave broadcasters with significant discretion to

47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000) ("[T]he Commission shall determine ... whether the
public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served by the granting of such
...).
application.
208 See Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943) (The public
interest standard of the Federal Communications Act "does not restrict the Commission
merely to the supervision of [broadcast] traffic. It puts upon the Commission the burden of
determining the composition of that traffic."). See also 47 U.S.C. § 308(d) (2000)
(requiring applicants for licenses and license renewals to submit to the FCC copies of prior
customer complaints regarding programming); FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
POLICY STATEMENT ON COMPARATIVE BROADCAST HEARINGS, 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 397-98
(1965) (describing programming as a factor used to resolve competing license applications).
209 See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 742-51 (1978) (plurality opinion) (stating
that the government has the power to restrict indecent broadcasting); Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding that the
government may restrict speech to further a compelling state interest, such as "protecting
young minds from the corrupting influences of indecent speech").
210 47 C.F.R. § 73.501 (2005) (regarding FM radio stations), id. at § 73.621 (regarding
television stations).
211 The FCC's fairness doctrine was once more comprehensive than it is today. See Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-71, 373-75 (1969) (describing the earlier
doctrine); Syracuse Peach Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing
the FCC's partial retreat from the fairness doctrine). Today, however, the fairness doctrine
still significantly prohibits a station from providing airtime to any political candidate
without providing equal airtime to all other candidates for the same office. See 47 U.S.C. §
315(a) (2000).
207
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choose their own programming, and purport to avoid "censorship, 212 they all
constitute conscious speech discrimination on the part of the government, and
would almost certainly be found unconstitutional if applied to other mediums
of communication. 21 3 According to the Supreme Court, content regulation is
more tolerable in the broadcast medium for two reasons. First, the broadcast
spectrum is a scarce resource, allowing only a limited number of stations, and
therefore government may require broadcasters to act as proxies for the
community. 2 14 Second, radio and television broadcasts are "a uniquely
are intrusive into the privacy of
pervasive presence in the lives of Americans,"
2 15
home, and are easily accessible to children.
These justifications starkly conflict with anti-discrimination theory. 216 If
speech neutrality were a fundamental principle of good government, then it
would seem that the scarcity of broadcast resources and pervasiveness of
broadcast communication would cut against, rather than in favor of, contentbased controls. It is perhaps ironic that the government may implement
content-based policies in a medium of communication that is so pervasive and
influential, precisely because it is so pervasive and influential.
The lesson of broadcast regulation, however, may be that (in the prevailing
view, at least) speech neutrality is not a primary First Amendment value; it is
only a means of achieving higher goals. If this is true, then the value of
neutrality might vary from one medium of communication to another. Perhaps
the freedom of speech is best served by a government that is content-neutral in
some forums, partially neutral in others, and actively speech-biased in other
forums. This makes sense within a First Amendment theory that is focused on
preserving adequate means of communication for speakers, and which also
recognizes the government's ability to make a positive difference in the
marketplace of ideas through some content-based policies. It does not make
sense from a perspective of the First Amendment that regards speech
discrimination as inherently wrong.
Protectionof the PoliticalProcess

F.

Another significant exception to the rule against content discrimination
exists for political campaign speech. Since the early twentieth century, federal
law has acted "to purge national politics of what [is] conceived to be the
See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed
to give the Commission the power of censorship .... ").
212

213 See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding
unconstitutional a requirement analogous to the FCC's fairness doctrine that newspapers
allow people who are criticized an equal opportunity to respond); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 874 (1997) (holding unconstitutional restrictions on indecency on the internet).
214 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390-94.
215 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978).

216 See supra Part I, especially text accompanying notes 19-21 and Part I.C.

2005]

SPEECHDISCRIMINATION

1145

pernicious influence of 'big money' campaign contributions. '217 Federal law
accomplishes this goal through several means, including by imposing caps on
individual campaign contributions, 218 by restricting campaign expenditures and
"electioneering communications" of certain organizations, 219 and by imposing
220
detailed disclosure requirements on both contributions and expenditures.
We should not doubt that campaign finance laws regulate speech in a
content-based way. Such laws burden private spending for speech on certain
22 1
topics (political campaigns), or for referring to certain people (candidates),
but do not apply to speech on other topics such as religion or business.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has upheld significant restrictions of both
campaign contributions and campaign expenditures under the First
222
Amendment.
According to the Supreme Court, regulations of political campaign
contributions are not subject to strict scrutiny, but instead are subject to a more
deferential standard. The Court has called it "closely-drawn scrutiny. '223 This
more deferential standard for campaign contribution is appropriate, says the
Court, for three reasons: first, the government has a significant interest in
preserving the integrity of political elections; second, contribution regulations
impose an only modest limitation on speech and association; and third,
Congress has particular expertise in this area.2 24 Moreover, even in areas of
campaign finance law where strict scrutiny remains applicable (including
restrictions on direct campaign expenditures), the Court has upheld some
content-based restrictions that serve the compelling interest of combating
22 5
corruption or avoiding undue influence.
217 United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957). For a background of such
laws, see McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 115-32 (2003).
218 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2000).
219 Id. at § 441b (regulating contributions or expenditures by national banks,
corporations, or labor organizations).
220 Id. at § 434.
221 See id. § 434(f)(3)(A) (defining "electioneering communication" to include any

broadcast that refers to a candidate for federal office).
222 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-38 (1976) (upholding key contribution
restrictions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142-224
(2003) (upholding many additional restrictions imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2003 (BCRA), including a soft-money ban and expanded restrictions on
"electioneering communications").
223 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137.
224 Id. at 134-138.
225 See, e.g., id., at 202-09 (upholding BCRA's expanded restrictions on "electioneering
communications"); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210 (1992) (upholding content-based
ordinance prohibiting political speech near polling places); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 668-69 (1990) (upholding content-based restriction on corporate
political expenditures).
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Accordingly, even in politics, prevailing First Amendment law does not
require government to be indifferent to the communicative effects of speech.
The law holds that, at least in some ways, government can attempt to improve
the society's discussion of politics and elections through active, content-based
intervention.
Captive Audiences

G.

The rule against content-based regulation also applies less strictly when the
government's purpose is to protect a captive audience. For example, in
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 226 the Supreme Court upheld a rule
prohibiting political advertisements on city buses, while simultaneously
allowing commercial advertisements. Although the rule was a clear example
of speech discrimination (on the basis of subject matter), the Court did not
even mention heightened scrutiny. Instead, Justices in the majority found that
a bus was not a public forum and that the city had a legitimate interest in
227
protecting captive bus passengers from intrusion into their privacy.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has used the captive audience principle to justify
228
regulations allowing homeowners to block sexually explicit mailings.
Although the parameters of the captive-audience exception are far from clear,
it is at least a factor that has influenced judicial decisions sometimes to excuse
content-based regulations.
H.

Low- Value/High-Harm Speech

Several important exceptions to the rule against content discrimination are
defined by the speech itself, and are justified by the speech's lack of positive
value or potential harm. These categories of less-protected speech include
incitement, threats, fighting words, obscenity, child pornography, false
statements of fact (including fraud, perjury and defamation), and to a lesser
degree commercial speech. 229 Each of these categories of First Amendment
analysis raises its own peculiar set of definitions and standards (as well as
problems), which I will not detail here. It is clear, however, that these
exceptions recognize a legitimate governmental interest in banning some
speech altogether, and heavily regulating other speech, precisely because of its
communicative effect.
Two things are worth briefly noting about these categories of unprotected or
less-protected speech. First, by no means do these categories represent small
or insignificant exceptions to the rule against content discrimination. The

226 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
227

Id. at 303-04 (plurality opinion); id. at 306-07 (Douglas, J., concurring).

228 Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
229 For a full description of these exceptions under current law, see VOLOKH, supra note

54, at ch. 2.
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category of commercial speech alone accounts for huge fields of content-based
government activity. Second, these categories are all defined by the content of
speech. Thus, in order to recognize and delineate each of these exceptions, the
Supreme Court must have engaged in its own content-based evaluation of
speech, judging that certain kinds of speech are so potentially harmful or so
inherently worthless that they should not be protected.2 30 The mere presence
of these exceptions in First Amendment law shows that the rule against content
discrimination does not always apply to courts.

I.

Speech Beyond the FirstAmendment's Boundaries and Unresolved Issues

There remain many other areas of law that routinely regulate the content of
private expression in specific contexts, which are not typically thought to
infringe the First Amendment. 231 These include antitrust law,232 securities

236
235
234
rules of evidence,
workplace harassment law,
law, 233 labor law,

copyright and trademark law, 237 panhandling restrictions, 238 regulation of

230 See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 ("It has been well observed that such utterances

are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.").
231 For a general exploration of the many kinds of speech that the First Amendment
typically ignores, see Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of The First Amendment: A

PreliminaryExploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004); see
also Volokh, supra note 121, at 1336-46 (discussing the uncharted zones of First
Amendment theory).
232 See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 425-28 (1990) (upholding
the Sherman Act's prohibition against promotion of certain boycotts).
233 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 203-11 (1985) (discussing the First Amendment
implications of regulating the speech of investment advisers); see also Aleta G. Estreicher,
Securities Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223, 223 (1990) (observing
that "[t]he received wisdom for fifty years has been that the first amendment is inapplicable
to speech relating to the operation of securities markets," and arguing that securities speech
should receive greater protection).
234 See NLRB v. Gissel, 395 U.S. 575, 616-20 (1969) (holding that it was an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA for a company president to tell employees that unionization could
result in closing of the plant, and that this speech prohibition does not violate the First
Amendment).
235 For an overview of this problem, see Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile
Work Environment" HarassmentLaw Restrict?, 85 GEo. L.J. 627 (1997).
236 For a thorough analysis of adjudicative speech (including courtroom speech) and its
relative lack of protection under the First Amendment, see Christopher J. Peters,
Adjudicative Speech and the FirstAmendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705 (2004).
237 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-21 (2003) (upholding the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 against a First Amendment challenge).
238

See Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
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building architecture, 239 court rules governing the citation of unpublished
precedent, 240 and rules of decorum in public meetings. 241 In each of these
fields, among others, government regulates private speech on the basis of its
content precisely because of its potential communicative impact. Often, we
may not recognize these examples of speech discrimination as raising serious
First Amendment issues because they are so commonplace. Indeed, litigants
rarely raise First Amendment arguments in these fields, usually with good
reason.
These practices show, at a minimum, that our society is well accustomed to
government-imposed speech discrimination. It pervasively surrounds us and
infects many areas of law. As Frederick Schauer has correctly observed, "even
the briefest glimpse at the vast universe of widely accepted content-based
restrictions on communications reveals that the speech with which the First
Amendment deals is the exception and the speech that may routinely be
242
regulated is the rule."
IV. THEORIES OF WRONGFUL SPEECH DISCRIMINATION

Given the number of ways in which society not only tolerates, but often
expects, government to regulate speech content, courts and scholars should be
more careful in how they describe the First Amendment's supposed aversion to
content discrimination. The Supreme Court was embarrassingly wrong in
Moseley to say that "above all else, the First Amendment means that

Panhandlers,Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1228-38 (1996)
(discussing the First Amendment implications of panhandling statutes).
239 See, e.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review of Cleveland Heights, 192 N.E.2d 74
(Ohio Ct. App. 1968) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to architectural regulations);
Kenneth G. Gill, The First Amendment and the Language of Architecture, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 395 (2003) (arguing that architecture is a form of expression that should be
protected by the First Amendment).
240 See Peters, supra note 236, at 780-83 (arguing that no-citation rules should be found
to violate the First Amendment).
241 For example, the Rules of Parliamentary Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson for
use in the Senate, and which continue to govern House of Representatives proceedings,
contain numerous provisions regulating the manner of permissible speech in Congress.
These include that:
No one is to speak impertinently or beside the question, superfluous, or tediously....
No person is to use indecent language against the proceedings of the House...; nor to
digress from the matter.., by speaking reviling, nipping or unmannerly words against
a particular Member .... No one is to disturb another in his speech by hissing,
coughing, spitting, speaking or whispering to another.
Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice §§ 354-64, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 107284 at 173-80.
242Schauer, supra note 231, at 1768.
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government has no power to restrict expression because of its.., content. 243
It is even misleading to say that most of the time content-based regulation is
disfavored, or that the principle admits few exceptions. Yet courts and
commentators continue to make statements like this uncritically, often using
them as the starting point of First Amendment analysis.
Rather than ask why the Constitution so strongly disfavors content-based
regulation, we would come closer to understanding current First Amendment
law by asking why the Constitution sometimes disfavors it, and why often it
does not. What are the underlying principles that separate wrongful speech
discrimination on the part of government from the many instances of
acceptable speech discrimination?
This section argues that the First Amendment's aversion to content-based
regulation serves primarily to protect speech for its informational and
expressive value; it does not represent a general ideal of government neutrality
toward speech. The presumption forbidding government speech discrimination
serves this speech-maximizing purpose in many settings, but not in all settings.
Accordingly, the presumption does not apply to all government action. It does
not even apply to all regulations of speech.
The Illusory Distinction Between Subsidies and Penalties
As a starting place for separating wrongful speech discrimination from
acceptable discrimination, it might seem natural to distinguish between
subsidies and penalties. If the First Amendment assumes that more speech is
generally better for society, this suggests that government should generally be
free to subsidize speech, or to add its own speech to the marketplace of ideas,
even if in a discriminatory way. The only discriminatory speech laws that
present difficulties, one might argue, are those that selectively restrict or
burden private speech.
The distinction between speech subsidies (including all government actions
that facilitate or reward speech) on the one hand, and speech penalties or
restrictions on the other hand, seems appealing on the surface. It finds support
in the text of the First Amendment, which addresses government actions
"abridging" the freedom of speech, but which says nothing about government
actions promoting speech. 244 The subsidy/penalty distinction is also consistent
with Supreme Court authority suggesting that the government should respond
to speech that it disagrees with by persuasion and education, rather than by
restricting the dangerous speech in question. 245 As Justice Brandeis famously
A.

Police Dep't ofChi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971).
See, e.g., NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598-99 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing that the Speech Clause only prohibits laws "abridging" speech, and does not curtail
the power of government to grant selective subsidies).
245 Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)
("[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and
243
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wrote, "If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
246
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
The distinction is less useful, however, than it might first seem when it
comes to identifying wrongful speech discrimination. The core problem is that
the difference between a discriminatory subsidy and a discriminatory penalty is
often a matter of perspective; many discriminatory government actions
affecting speech may reasonably be described as either subsidies or penalties.
Distinguishing between discriminatory subsidies and discriminatory penalties
for First Amendment purposes is like trying to distinguish, for constitutional
247
purposes, between laws that prevent harm and those that confer benefits.
All discriminatory laws impose both relative burdens and relative benefits, and
it is therefore misleading to try to distinguish in the abstract between laws that
do one or the other.
Consider the following difficult cases:
* A state legislature imposes different sales tax rates for print
publications, depending upon the subject of the publication.
Publications on the subject of sports and recreation receive the most
248
favorable tax rate.
* A public school designates a bulletin board for teachers and
students to post viewpoints expressing tolerance of gay and lesbian
lifestyles, but does not allow contrary viewpoints to be posted on
249
the board.
* A city prohibits picketing near public schools during school hours,
250
but allows an exception for peaceful labor picketing.
All of these could be described as speech subsidies for those whose
messages are advantaged, or alternatively as speech penalties for those whose
The supposed distinction, without further
messages are disadvantaged.
definition, provides little help in distinguishing what is beneficial speech
discrimination from what is improper speech discrimination.
This is not to say that the distinction between subsidies and penalties is
necessarily meaningless or irrational. It has a tendency, however, to be
conclusory and to hide the important underlying questions. When one calls a
government action the denial of a subsidy or the imposition of a penalty, the

that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them.").
246 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
247 For a similar analysis as to the harm/benefit distinction in regulatory takings law, see
John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1045-47

(2003).
248
249
250

E.g., Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 224 (1987).
E.g., Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000).
E.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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characterization generally implies a judgment about whether the affected
speaker had an initial entitlement or reasonable expectation to the benefit in
question. Most would say, for example, that a government's refusal to pay
someone for his or her speech (assuming there is no contract) is the denial of a
subsidy, because one is not generally entitled to money in connection with
speech. By contrast, a government's refusal to allow someone to speak in a
public park during daytime hours would more commonly be viewed as a
restriction or penalty, because one is presumptively entitled to speak in a
The implicit baseline separating entitlements from nonpublic forum.
entitlements is what drives the distinction between subsidies and penalties.
Any distinction between subsidies and penalties depends upon some kind of
entitlement baseline. If courts fail to recognize any such baseline, then the
distinction is only semantic. On the other hand, if the law is capable of
defining a speaker's baseline speech entitlements, then it appears that the focus
on speech discrimination is wholly unnecessary. Courts could protect a
person's speech entitlements directly without regard to whether there is speech
discrimination.
For example, assume the underlying entitlement question depends upon
such factors as tradition, property rights, and whether the speaker has sufficient
expressive opportunities. In that event, we could just as easily apply those
criteria to all content-based regulations and to all content-neutral regulations,
no matter what the form. A city's refusal to allow an artist to display an
offensive painting at City Hall would be constitutional, not because it involves
a requested subsidy, but because the artist has ample freedom to display the
painting elsewhere and there is no tradition supporting a public right to display
art in City buildings (i.e., the speaker has no entitlement). By contrast, the
City's refusal to allow the artist to display an offensive painting in the artist's
own home would be unconstitutional, not because it is a content-based
restriction, but rather because it would deny an important and traditional
medium of expression (thereby infringing upon a speech entitlement).
The distinction between subsidies and penalties, therefore, tends in the
difficult cases be more illusory than it is helpful. It is at best a conclusory
distinction based on an implied substantive standard that should be fleshed out.
If the underlying policy of this distinction is to provide plentiful means of
communication, then that standard should apply equally to all content-based
regulations and to all content-neutral regulations. The distinction, by its own
terms, does not explain why some content-based regulations are subject to
heightened scrutiny, while content-neutral regulations. usually are not.
Moreover, the distinction does not explain why the Supreme Court has
sometimes found unconstitutional content-based restrictions in programs
251
admitted to be subsidies, such as monetary speech grants.
This leads to the possibility that there are other values driving the distinction

251

See infra Part IV.D.2.
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between content-based and content-neutral regulations, such as the value of
government impartiality.
The Limited Usefulness of Impartiality Theories

B.
1.

Impermissible Motives

Several leading First Amendment scholars have argued that a core function
of the content-based/content-neutral distinction (if not all freedom of speech
doctrine) is to prevent government from regulating speech for impermissible
reasons. 252 According to this view, the freedom of speech, at its core, bars
government from imposing speech regulations that are motivated by hostility
toward particular viewpoints, or that are otherwise supported by illegitimate
purposes. 253 Thus, one might argue that because content-based regulations are
more likely the product of impermissible motives than content-neutral
to strict scrutiny
regulations (regardless of their effect), the former are subject
254
while the latter are subject to a more deferential standard.
I do not believe that the concept of impermissible motive goes as far as
suggested in explaining the basic structures of impermissible content
discrimination. The concept of speech-biased motives does not well explain
why courts sometimes disfavor content discrimination, particularly when one
considers the many types of content discrimination that are routinely
allowed. 255 Taken as a whole, existing freedom of speech doctrine seems
designed to limit the means and degree to which government may influence the
speech market, but it does not bar the government from acting based on
speech-biased motives, nor should it be radically restructured to do so.
To see this, let us consider some of the allegedly impermissible speech25 6
biased motives that commentators and cases have purported to identify.

252 See supra note 10.

253 See Kagan, supra note 10, at 414 (arguing that a primary aim of the First Amendment
is to root out impermissible government motives).
254 Elena Kagan describes this theory in the most detail, not only as a justification for the
content-neutral/content-based distinction, but also as a basis for many other First
Amendment doctrines. See id. at 443-505.
255 See discussion supra Part III.
256 In addition to preventing speech-biased motives, commentators have also suggested
that First Amendment doctrine serves to prevent government officials from acting based on
their own personal or political self-interest. See Kagan, supra note 10, at 428; Stone, supra
note 10, at 228. While I do not dispute that self-interest is an impermissible motive, it is one
that may easily creep into any kind of government action, whether speech related or not.
The principle that government actors should be motivated by the public interest, and not by
their personal interests, is policed primarily by the political process and by the structure of
government. To the extent that First Amendment doctrines serve to prevent selfishness by
government officials, the relationship is quite indirect.
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Stripped of any reference to means, 257 some of the most commonly disfavored
motives may be defined as follows:
*
Viewpoint hostility: the motive of causing more citizens to agree
with the government on some issue of opinion or258fact, and of
causing fewer people to agree with contrary positions.
* Avoidance of offense: the motive of causing fewer instances of
259
offense through communication.
* Paternalism:the motive of causing more expression that will lead
people to make good choices for themselves, and less expression
260
that will lead to harmful choices.
* Aesthetic or moral preference: the motive of causing more
expression that is artistic or pleasing, and less expression that is
26 1
immoral or displeasing.
Putting aside what some cases say, current First Amendment law does not
treat any of these motives as per se impermissible. Take any of these
supposedly impermissible motives, and there are many contexts in which
government is allowed to act for precisely such a purpose, with positive results
for society. For example, government acts with a viewpoint-based motive
anytime a public school teacher marks a student's exam answer as correct or
257 If a governmental motive is per se impermissible as a basis for affecting speech, it
should be possible to define it without reference to the government's means of acting on that
motive. Otherwise, we should question whether it is the government's means rather than the
motive that makes such an action inherently wrong.
258See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984) ("A

regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of
a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of
a 'law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."') (quoting Consol. Edison Co.
of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980)); Kagan, supra note 10, at 428
(arguing that regulating speech based on its viewpoint is inherently impermissible); Stone,
supra note 10, at 227-28 (arguing that prohibiting or permitting speech based on its
viewpoint is an impermissible motive).
259 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."); Kagan,
supra note 10, at 429 (stating that regulating speech simply because it may be offensive to
some is also an impermissible motive); Stone, supra note 10, at 214-16 (recognizing that the
Supreme Court has long held that regulations of speech may not be grounded on the fact that
such speech is offensive to a group because this would create a heckler's veto).
260 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976) (stating that the First Amendment makes a choice against paternalism as a basis for
restricting speech); Stone, supra note 10, at 212-13, 228 (arguing that paternalism is an
impermissible motive in regulating speech).
261See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)
("What the Constitution says is that [moral and aesthetic] judgments are for the individual to
make, not for the Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a majority.").
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incorrect; whenever an agency edits a scientific report for accuracy before
publishing it; and whenever government disciplines an employee for
publishing lies or misguided opinions in an official capacity. Under current
law the government is allowed, in many important contexts, to regulate and
restrict speech precisely based upon whether it agrees or disagrees with the
message. Otherwise, it could never correct a public school teacher for teaching
that whites are superior to blacks, that murder is good, or that sex with
strangers is safe and fun. Ideological bias is not a per se illegitimate motive
for regulating speech. It is, in fact, a highly praiseworthy motive
262 in many
circumstances. It is only disfavored, if at all, in defined situations.
The same kind of analysis disqualifies other allegedly per se wrongful
motives, including the motives of avoiding offense, assisting people to make
wise choices for themselves, and preventing people from being persuaded to
do harm. The government routinely regulates speech for all of these reasons,
as when a local school board chooses what to include or exclude in its
education curriculum or when a government agency decides whether to publish
offensive material on its website, and there are few who would argue that this
is a bad thing. None of these motives are inherently unconstitutional reasons
for regulating speech; they are troubling only when coupled with certain
means of regulating speech.
One might try to preserve a theory of per se impermissible motives by
drawing analytical boundaries between various government capacities. One
might argue, for instance, that it is inherently unconstitutional for government
to act with certain speech motives in its capacity as a sovereign (i.e., when it
uses the police power to regulate the private speech of citizens), but not in its
2 63
capacity as educator, speaker, or employer.
I have two responses.
First, it seems doubtful that the theory of
impermissible motives can even consistently explain the current law of speech
discrimination within the range of police power action. There are some
categories of content-based regulations that do not seem to be infected at all by
impermissible motives (such as the exception for labor picketing struck down
in Moseley) yet which are still subject to strict scrutiny. 264 And there are other
categories of content-based regulations (such as obscenity laws, fraud
regulations, defamation laws, and commercial speech regulations) that are
262 See discussion supra Part III.A.
261 Elena Kagan explicitly excludes government speech, government employment and
public education from her motive-based analysis. See Kagan, supra note 10, at 432-33.

Larry Alexander ventures briefly into these fields and observes that they present a "major
problem" for the position that government is not supposed to act on the basis of its
evaluations of speech, and concludes that "theoretical reconciliation" is needed. See
Alexander, supra note 10, at 953-54.
264 Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 102 (1971). Eugene Volokh describes
this weakness of motive-based analysis at greater length in his article on speech as conduct.
See Volokh, supra note 121, at 1301-03.
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commonly supported by motives having to do with the falsity or offensiveness
are wholly or partially exempt from the rule against
of a message, yet which
2 65
content discrimination.
Secondly, and more fundamentally, if our purpose is to identify the
normative underpinnings of the First Amendment, we should ask why it is that
the rule against content discrimination applies to some government actions
affecting speech, but not to all government actions affecting speech. If
different First Amendment principles apply to government in its supposed
capacity as sovereign than in other capacities, there must be some higher First
Amendment principle to explain those boundaries. It is not enough to simply
say "That's different because the government is acting as an educator."
Certainly, we would not dream of carving out a government-as-educator
exception to the Equal Protection Clause's prohibition against racial
discrimination. Nor is there a government-as-educator exception to the
Establishment Clause's rule against religious indoctrination, nor to the Free
Exercise Clause's rule against religious discrimination. The fact that the
Speech Clause's anti-discrimination principle contains large exceptions
relating to the government's roles as educator, employer, and speech promoter,
suggests that it is a very different kind of anti-discrimination principle than
these others, and that it rests upon different normative grounds. This
difference stands in need of an explanation, and no theory of impermissible
motives can supply that explanation.
Once one concedes that an allegedly impermissible motive for regulating
speech is not always impermissible, but is only sometimes impermissible, the
concept loses much of its force as an overarching normative theory. If it is
unconstitutional for government to enact statute A (say, a total ban on speech
of a particular viewpoint) for the purpose of preventing the spreading of a
dangerous idea, but is perfectly constitutional for it to enact statute B (say, an
education curriculum change) to prevent the spreading of the same dangerous
idea, the difference is one of means, not motive. The normative principle that
drives this distinction must have something do with the effects of government
action on the interests of speakers and listeners in society, not with correcting
the government's basic intentions.
Focusing on the government's motive, as applied to some carefully defined
situations, might serve as a vehicle for accomplishing some higher First
Amendment purpose, such as preserving plentiful opportunities for speech and
securing a wide dissemination of information. But if we know that the
ultimate aim of the First Amendment is to preserve speech opportunities, rather
than to prevent all government action based on speech-biased motives, it seems
that we would do better to discuss the content-neutral/content-based distinction
directly in terms of how the distinction maximizes speech, rather than confuse
265 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 329 (1974) (stating that, as regards
defamation laws, "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
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the issue by speaking of impermissible motives (which, in any case, are only
sometimes impermissible).
2.

Distorting Effects

If the concept of impermissible motives does not explain why content-based
regulations are only sometimes disfavored, then what about the distorting
effects of such laws? Content-based laws have the obvious potential of
distorting the speech market and skewing the presentation of viewpoints.
Some have argued that the rule against content discrimination serves to prevent
such distortion. 266 As Alexander Meiklejohn argued, it "mutilates the thinking
process of the community" for government to tip the scale in favor of one side
267
of a public debate.
The anti-distortion argument assumes that it is the relative balance of ideas
and viewpoints that the rule against content discrimination seeks to preserve,
as distinct from preserving some minimal level of speech. Thus, it would
sometimes be preferable for the government to eliminate a forum altogether, or
to prohibit some means of communication altogether, rather than selectively
allow speech in a way that gives one side an advantage in the debate. This
value is therefore analytically distinct from the value of maximizing speech.
The anti-distortion argument, however, has several problems as a
description for why heightened scrutiny applies to content-based regulation.
First, the theory is even more difficult to reconcile with the exceptions to the
rule against content discrimination than a theory of impermissible motives. As
I have explained, government routinely influences the marketplace of ideas
through content-based policies, including advertising campaigns, government
reports, education, speech subsidies, and single-topic forums. 268 These
practices undoubtedly have a profound influence on the balance of opinions
that are expressed and believed in society - that is their purpose. If
government distortion is inherently wrong, then these practices ought to be per
se unconstitutional.
Second, almost all laws, including content-neutral speech regulations and
regulations of non-expressive conduct, cause distortions in the marketplace of
ideas, even if that is not their intent.2 69 For example, the current speech market
is influenced largely by existing distributions of property and wealth, which
are the function of property laws, tax laws, employment laws and monetary
policies. 270 Because of the way such laws are structured, wealthy people and
266 See Stone, supra note 10, at 198, 217-27; Williams, supra note 10, at 677-79.
267 MEIKLEJOHN,

supra note 15, at 27.

268 See supra Part III (discussing the many exceptions to the rule against content-based

discrimination).
269 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 929-31 (arguing that essentially all laws have speech
differential effects).
270 Id.
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wealthy organizations have more money to spend on speech, and therefore
their ideas have more influence in society. A true anti-distortion theory,
therefore, should not only find a way to prevent the disparate impacts that
content-neutral speech regulations impose (which are many), but also the
general distorting influences that non-speech laws impose, such as tax laws.
Indeed, because of the many ways that government actions already distort
the speech market, heightened scrutiny for content-based laws may serve to
perpetuate such distortion as much as prevent it, by preventing corrective
measures. 27 1 If wealthy people have more influence in elections than poor
people, and if society's background laws are partly to blame for this, a sensible
way to further the goal of expressive equality would be to impose spending
limits in elections. Current law, however, flatly rejects this equality-of-speech
justification for expenditure restrictions in elections. As the Court explained in
Buckley v. Valeo, "the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment. ' '272 The anti-distortion argument,
therefore, seems to provide little explanation for why the First Amendment
disfavors some content-based speech policies and allows others.
The anti-distortion theory is also normatively troubling. Any workable
theory of distortion must depend upon some concept of an ideal speech market
without influence from the government. Whether one defines that ideal speech
market according to the regulatory status quo (thus grandfathering in all of the
distortions of the past), or according to some pre-governmental state of nature,
there is little reason to believe that either of these "ideals" is the best our
society can hope for in terms of public deliberation. Government can and does
positively influence the marketplace of ideas in many profound ways,
including through education, subsidies, regulation, and through adding its own
voice. 273 While some government influences might do more harm than good
for the deliberative process, it is unreasonable to suppose that we would be
better off without any governmental influence on society's speech and ideas
whatsoever, even if this were possible. The primary First Amendment
question, therefore, ought not to be whether government has distorted the
marketplace of ideas, but rather whether it has done so in a beneficial way.
C.

The Informational Value of Speech Revisited

I have argued that heightened scrutiny for content-based regulations does
not serve a primary purpose of requiring the government to be impartial toward
expression, nor does it prevent government distortion of the marketplace of
271 See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 296-97 (1992)
(suggesting that content-based regulation may serve as a corrective measure for an already
skewed marketplace).
272 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).
273See discussion supra Part III.
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274

ideas.
Equality and neutrality are not primary freedom of speech values.
They are, at most, means to an end. If heightened scrutiny for (some) contentbased regulations makes sense, it must be justified ultimately as a speechmaximizing measure for the purpose of improving public deliberation, not
because the Constitution values speech equality for its own sake.
The speech maximizing value holds that more speech is generally better for
society, even if some speech comes from biased government sources, and even
if government is actively skewing the private speech market. Moreover, the
principle recognizes that some speech is more valuable than other speech, and
that ultimately the quality of speech in society matters as much as quantity.
According to this view, the freedom of speech is primarily aimed at promoting
quality public deliberation on topics of public importance. It is not, at the core,
a content-neutral doctrine.
Of course, even in this framework, courts should be skeptical of laws that
exclude messages from the speech market on the basis that they have no value.
The Speech Clause presupposes that government and society often fail to
appreciate a message's potential value at the time that it is expressed, and that
some of the most valuable contributions to the speech market are messages that
challenge society's prevailing views.
It does not follow, however, that unpopular viewpoints or low-minded
speech must be given equal opportunities as speech that society seeks to
promote, or that government should play no role in regulating speech on the
basis of its speech preferences. Government and society are sometimes wrong
about what messages and subjects have value, but they are often right. Indeed,
many of our well-established institutions are premised on the ability of
government to raise the quality of speech and education in society.27 5 It would
do serious damage to the freedom of speech's ultimate goal - that of promoting
quality public deliberation for the sake of knowledge, enlightenment and
informed decision-making2 76 _ for government institutions to ignore society's
collective wisdom about what subjects, viewpoints and forms of speech are
For those whose messages are not favored by the
most enlightening.
government, the essence of the freedom of speech is not that government be
neutral toward their speech, but that there exist adequate expressive means to
communicate those ideas.
Indeed, because speech is only as valuable as its content, and because biased
forums allow certain views and topics to be analyzed more thoroughly, the
speech market functions best when government imposes a mix of biased
forums and unbiased forums, provided that the biased forums are calculated to

See discussion infra Parts IV.B.l and IV.B.2.
Police Dep't of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971) ("To permit the continued
building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our
people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censorship.").
276 See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1971).
274
275
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bring out the most valuable kinds of exchanges. The best example of this is
the structure of public universities. At the typical university, there are settings
in which certain viewpoints are privileged (a classroom lecture in which the
instructor's viewpoints are offered as fact), there are settings in which certain
subjects are privileged (a sponsored debate or discussion), and there are open
forums in which all subjects and viewpoints are treated equally. This kind of
varied speech market allows those viewpoints and subjects that the government
believes have highest value to receive critical attention, but it also allows
members of the university community ample freedom to advance other
subjects and viewpoints, including those that challenge the orthodox views of
society.
This framework, based on the informational value of speech, explains many
aspects of First Amendment law. It explains why content-based regulations in
public education, in government speech, and in other government programs
designed to promote valuable speech are usually constitutional (provided that
speakers of contrary viewpoints have broad freedom outside of these settings
to convey their views to society). 277 Informational value of speech also
explains why some harmful categories of speech, such as fraud, are entitled 2to
78
no protection whatsoever, and may be banned by content-based regulations.
And finally, it explains why some burdensome content-neutral regulations are
unconstitutional, even though they are neutral, because they do not preserve
ample means of expression.
What is most difficult to explain under the framework, however, is why
First Amendment doctrine sometimes requires strict scrutiny of modest
content-based regulations, while only requiring intermediate scrutiny of
modest content-neutral regulations. Content-neutral regulations have the
potential to prohibit as much valuable speech as content-based regulations.
Why, then, should a limited and otherwise reasonable restriction on speech be
considered problematic because it does not apply to all viewpoints, subjects or
messages?
D.

Two Reasonsfor the Content-Neutral/Content-BasedDiscriminationas a
Means ofPreservingSpeech Opportunities
1.

Limitations of Judicial Review

Imagine what free expression would be like if courts did away with the
content-neutral/content-based distinction completely. Courts could in theory
hold that the freedom of speech protects a guaranteed floor of expressive
freedom, including expressive means such as the right to speak on major public
sidewalks, the right to use the mail, the right to display signs, the right to use
the internet, and the right to publish and distribute literature. But it would not
See discussion supra Part III.
278 See discussion supra Part I1.
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be concerned with government action that selectively gives certain speakers
more opportunities than the minimum, such as the opportunity to speak at a

public school assembly.
In theory, it appears that this system would advance the goal of maximizing
valuable speech. The freedom of speech would guarantee that no idea or
subject could be banned from public discussion or unduly burdened, but it
would allow government to promote those ideas, subjects, and forms of
expression that have particular educational value. The question in every
freedom of speech case therefore would be whether the government has unduly
burdened the speaker's ability to participate in the marketplace of ideas, or, in
other words, whether it has allowed ample means of expression - not whether
it has shown a preference for some kinds of speech.
In practice, however, this lack of distinction would be quite dangerous to the
marketplace of ideas. One reason for concern is that the Supreme Court's
cases involving content-neutral laws have often been highly deferential to
government regulators, providing only weak protection for the freedom of
speech. 279 If this became the standard for content-based regulations as well, a
great deal of valuable communication could be lost. This problem could in
theory be solved by applying a more rigorous level of scrutiny to contentneutral regulations, instead of applying a lower level of scrutiny to contentbased regulations. 280 Indeed, it is even arguable that the Court's heightened
concern with content-based regulations in recent decades is partly to blame for
its lax scrutiny of content-neutral regulations. 281 But there is nonetheless a
strong chance that a unified standard would simply mean less protection for
speech.
Second, content-based regulations seem to raise a greater risk of judicial
bias than content-neutral regulations. 282 In cases involving content-based
regulations, judges generally know whose message is hurt the most by the law,
279 See Alexander, supra note 10, at 925-26 (arguing that because content-neutral laws
receive such little scrutiny from the courts that they therefore provide almost no protection
for speech); Volokh, supra note 121, at 1307-08 (arguing that the Supreme Court's record of
under-enforcing the "ample means of communication" standard counsels against eliminating
the content-based/content-neutral distinction).
280 See Martin Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 113, 142 (1981) (arguing that courts should abandon the content distinction and
"subject all restrictions on expression to the same critical scrutiny traditionally reserved for
regulations drawn in terms of content").
281 Justice Marshall argued in his dissenting opinion in Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, that the content-based/content-neutral distinction (which, as the author of
Moseley, he had championed), was being misused by the Court to excuse too many contentneutral regulations, rather than, as it was intended, to raise the level of scrutiny for contentbased regulations. 468 U.S. 288, 313-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The rule of contentneutrality, Marshall complained, had become a ceiling instead of a floor. Id. at 313.
282 See Stone, supra note 10, at 225; Volokh, supra note 121, at 1308-10.
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increasing the likelihood that the judges' own evaluations of the message will
lead them to under-enforce the freedom of speech when unorthodox
for content-based
viewpoints are the subject of litigation. Heightened scrutiny
283
regulations, one might argue, protects against this risk.
The most serious problem with equalizing the standards for content-neutral
and content-based regulations, however, arises not from the theoretical
substance of an "ample means" or "undue burden" standard, nor from the
possibility of judicial bias, but from the inherent limitations of judicial review
and the separation of powers. In many areas of First Amendment adjudication,
courts are limited by a lack of judicially manageable standards. For this
reason, courts cannot resolve every issue that is relevant to an "ample means"
or "undue burden" standard (no matter how much they value the freedom of
This
speech) without intruding upon other branches of government.
appropriately leads to a reliance on legislative judgments and a focus on
whether laws are content-based.
Consider the kinds of challenging cases that a court might face while
applying an undue burden test if it were to treat the presence of content
discrimination as irrelevant:
" A city enacts an ordinance that prohibits marijuana legalization
advocates from distributing literature within 200 feet of public
school entrances, while allowing all other speakers to distribute
literature within 100 feet of a public school entrance. A court
would be forced to decide whether the First Amendment guarantees
a right to express oneself closer than 200 feet to a public school
entrance, ignoring what the government has allowed other speakers
to do.
" A state imposes a sales tax on publications expressing opposition to
the state's education policy at a rate of 6%, while taxing all other
publications at the rate of 4%. A court would ignore how other
speakers are taxed, and would have to decide in isolation whether a
6% sales tax is an undue burden.
* A city council establishes a zone for movie theatres that do not
show "political documentaries," and another less favorable zone for
theatres that do show such films. The sole question would be
whether the city allows ample means of expression for political
documentaries, without regard to the existence of a zone where

283 If this were the only problem with content-based regulations, it might seem an overreaction for courts to apply strict scrutiny. Judicial. bias is a risk in many cases, including
those involving content-neutral regulations. See Stone, supra note 10, at 225-26 (arguing
that bias might impair the ability of judges to evaluate both content-based restrictions as
well as content-neutral restrictions that have different impacts on specific viewpoints). The
usual way for courts to guard against judicial bias is to adhere to bright-line rules and
precedent, and consciously to apply justice even-handedly - not to impose strict scrutiny.
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other films are allowed.
A city issues a parade license to a white supremacist organization,
but gives the organization a less visible parade route than it
typically gives to other parade organizers. The sole constitutional
question would be whether the route provided for white
supremacists' is visible enough for constitutional purposes, without
regard to what the city has allowed for other parade organizers.
In all of these cases, a court would be forced to answer whether the speech
opportunities given to those whose messages are disfavored are minimally
sufficient, regardless of whether others have been given better opportunities.
The answers to these questions, however, depend on the nature of the
governmental interests at stake and factual circumstances that are likely to vary
from one community to another - issues that courts are not always well
equipped to resolve. Not only would this method of analysis increase the
litigation burden of courts to attempt to resolve such detailed questions, but,
more importantly, it would defy the appropriate judicial role. Elected officials
are usually better situated, both practically and legally, to make the kinds of
site-specific, community-specific, and number-specific policy judgments that
are inherent in regulating the time, place, and manner of speech.
A legal regime without any regard for content discrimination would
therefore force courts into one of two unacceptable modes of adjudication.
Courts could either adopt a policy of deference to legislatures, in which case
the tyranny of the majority could easily push unpopular speech to the fringes of
society, limiting it to undesirable locations, overtaxing it, and generally giving
it no real opportunity to be heard. Or courts could effectively take over the
functions of legislatures and local zoning authorities, drafting tax policy
directly, designing parade routes, zoning the location of bookstores and
theatres, and deciding the details of where, when, and how people must
minimally be allowed to speak. Neither alternative would be good for society.
The first would compromise the freedom of speech; the second would
compromise the separation of powers, popular sovereignty and the advantages
of local government.
A First Amendment doctrine that disfavors content discrimination, while
applying more lenient scrutiny to content-based regulations, provides a way for
courts to avoid these extremes. It allows legislatures and other elected officials
to exercise their comparative advantage in making initial policy judgments,
while at the same time ensuring a meaningful range of expressive opportunity
for all speakers, including for speakers of unpopular views. The presumption
against content discrimination, one might say, reflects a judicial practice of
adopting the legislature's initial policy judgments in determining what are the
minimal opportunities for expression that the First Amendment requires. The
result is a rough presumption (applied to settings where deference is
appropriate) that whatever level of freedom the government determines is
appropriate for some speech, it can (and therefore constitutionally must)
*
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provide for all speech.
For example, when the question arises whether it is an undue burden on a
speaker's expressive interests to be barred from distributing leaflets within 200
feet of a public school entrance, it would be both difficult and improper for a
court to resolve that question in isolation. Instead, the court should consider it
relevant how the legislature has regulated other speech: If the legislature
prohibits all speakers, regardless of message, from distributing leaflets within
this zone, this is a good indication to the court that the legislature's policies
supporting this restriction are relatively strong, and are presumptively entitled
to deference. On the other hand, if the legislature allows other leaflets to be
distributed within this zone, this should indicate to the court that the
government could probably tolerate general leafleting without undermining
significant governmental interests. Given this indication, courts might
reasonably presume that for the legislature to impose the restriction on any
speech in that zone constitutes an undue burden, and is therefore
unconstitutional.
The same principle applies to a government's parade policies, its sales tax
rates, zoning codes, and countless other government decisions affecting the
time, place and manner of speech. In any situation where it is unclear to a
court, at the outset, where the constitutional line exists between protected
speech entitlements and non-entitlements - and where, therefore, deference to
elected officials is a legitimate factor - it is reasonable for courts to apply a
presumption that whatever regulations or policies the government has
established for speech that it favors are also feasible (and thus constitutionally
required) for speech that it disfavors. Anything more burdensome should be
presumed (subject to rebuttal) to impose an undue burden on speech. This
system of limited deference allows legislatures to participate in the judgment
of what is an undue burden on speech, without giving them too much ability to
It also allows a healthy variation among
burden unpopular speech.
communities in how speech is zoned and regulated.
It is important to emphasize that this rationale for the content-based/contentneutral distinction does not depend on a normative view that it is wrong for
government to have biased intentions against certain viewpoints or against
offensive speech, nor does it depend on the view that it is wrong for
government to grant or restrict speech opportunities in selective ways that
influence the marketplace of ideas. Rather, the presumption against content
discrimination is a rough way for courts to determine, in a world of imperfect
information, limited judicial expertise, and local variation, what those
minimum opportunities for expression are that the Constitution protects for all
speakers, including those who express unpopular viewpoints. If courts were
omniscient policy-makers and could exercise complete judgment without
violating the separation of powers, there might be no need for a presumption
against content discrimination. As it stands, in a world where many things are
imperfect, the presumption against content discrimination is probably the best

1164

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1 103

available way of protecting a robust range of expressive freedom while
respecting the limits of judicial review.
If the content-based/content-neutral distinction is a device for determining
whether certain regulations unduly burden speech, this also explains why in
some settings the existence of content discrimination is irrelevant. Although
courts cannot competently make all of the detailed policy judgments that are
inherent in an undue burden standard, they can certainly make some judgments
with confidence. There are some speech opportunities that are so obviously
above what the Constitution requires for any private speaker, such as the
opportunity to speak to a captive public school audience, that government may
regulate these opportunities according to content. This explains, for example,
why government may regulate what teachers say in the public school
classrooms according to both viewpoint and subject, 284 because we know that
no one is initially entitled by the First Amendment to this speaking
opportunity.
Moreover, there are also some opportunities that courts can confidently
recognize as protected, regardless of how the government has treated other
speakers, such as the right to place a political sign in the window of one's
house. 285 In these situations, even a content-neutral law restricting the
opportunity should be held unconstitutional.
In between these categories, however, lies a vast range of uncertainty where
the precise boundary between speech entitlements and non-entitlements is
fuzzy, and which courts are not able to define by themselves. In these settings,
the rule against content discrimination works as a reasonable proxy for
determining whether a speaker has been given ample means of communication.
If this is accurate, then the normative framework proposed in Part I of this
article is misleading. There are not two different zones of speech protection
based on two separate First Amendment values (anti-discrimination and speech
maximization). Instead, there are three zones of protection, and they are all
based on the same underlying policy - maximizing the flow of valuable
information within society by ensuring plentiful expressive opportunities for
all speakers, while at the same time allowing government to provide additional
expressive opportunities for certain subjects, viewpoints and modes of
expression that it values the most.
The three zones of protection consist of: (1) a range of recognizable speech
entitlements, which government may not restrict through any kind of
regulation; (2) a range of recognizable non-entitlements, which government
need not provide, and, if it does so, it may provide and regulate in a contentbased way; and (3) a range in which speech entitlements are uncertain, and
where the rule against content discrimination therefore operates as a
See discussion supra Part I1.B.
See Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994) (holding that such a right exists
regardless of content discrimination).
284

285
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presumptive boundary between entitlements and non-entitlements. All three of
these zones are large and are important to the marketplace of ideas. Their
relationship is shown in the following graphic:
Three Zones of Speech Protection
Maximum Speech
Toleration
Recognizable Non-Entitlements
Speech Discrimination Allowed
Example: Speaking to a captive
public school audience.
Range of UncertainEntitlements
and Limited Deference
Only Non-discriminatory
Regulations Allowed
Example: Holding a parade on a
major city street.

II

II

I

Speech
A

Speech
B

Speech
C

Recognizable Speech Entitlements
No Significant Restrictions
Allowed
Example: Placing a political sign
in one's window.
Zero Speech
Toleration

Admittedly, the presumption against content discrimination, as applied to
the center zone, does not perfectly enforce the speech maximizing value. Like
most rules, it is over- and under-inclusive to a degree. For example, it might in
some circumstances encourage legislatures to tolerate less speech than they
otherwise would tolerate in order to make their policies content-neutral. When
this happens, rather than raising the bar, the rule against content discrimination
causes a reduction in speech opportunity. Given the alternatives for enforcing
a baseline of expressive freedom, however, and considering the limitations of
judicial review, this downside risk to focusing on content discrimination seems
a reasonable cost to incur, even from a pure speech-maximizing perspective. It
is also offset by the encouragement that a presumption against content
discrimination provides to government in other settings to tolerate more speech
- especially speech expressing unpopular viewpoints.
This framework comes closer to explaining the hierarchy of standards in
First Amendment law, including exceptions to those standards, than either a
theory of impermissible motives or a theory of impermissible distortion. As a
general organizing principle, it is consistent with the current structure of First
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Amendment law, which in some settings requires heightened scrutiny for
content-based regulations and only intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral
regulations, while in other settings often allows content discrimination,
including even viewpoint discrimination.
2.

The Role of the Political Process

One important part of First Amendment doctrine is not explained by the
foregoing analysis. It is the line of authority that limits government's ability to
engage in speech discrimination with respect to subsidies (i.e., benefits that
courts can confidently recognize as non-entitlements without resort to the
presumption against speech discrimination).
These include monetary
incentives for speech, special speaking opportunities, public teaching
privileges, limited public forums, access to government mail systems, and
other benefits that are beyond what the Constitution minimally guarantees to
speakers.
While current law allows government substantial leeway to engage in
content discrimination in the provision of subsidies and special forums, it does
not allow unlimited discrimination, as one might expect if the sole purpose of
the Speech Clause were to preserve a minimum range of expressive freedom.
For example, the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a rule barring legal
aid payments to lawyers who challenge the validity of welfare laws, even
286
though the government could have terminated the entire legal aid program.
Similarly, the Court held unconstitutional a rule barring recipients of public
broadcasting grants from engaging in editorializing, even though the
287
government is not required to subsidize any broadcasting.
One might explain some constitutional limits in this area as an application of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, consistent with the goal of removing
undue burdens on speech. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes
that it sometimes amounts to an undue burden for government to force
individuals to choose between benefits that they have come to expect and First
Amendment freedoms - especially where the government does not have a good
reason for imposing the choice.2 88 This partially explains why speech
289
restrictions in government employment are subject to intermediate scrutiny.
It also might explain cases that invalidate restrictions on government funds that
excessively burdened speech in relation to the government's legitimate

286 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001).
287 FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 374 (1984).
288 As the Supreme Court stated in Perry v. Sindermann: "[I]f the government could deny
a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his
exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly."' 408 U.S. 593,
597 (1972) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
289 See supra note 202.
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interests. 290 Using the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, we might say that
the First Amendment requires government to accommodate private speech
where feasible, even in defining employment and benefit programs.
We should also consider the role of the political process in controlling
speech discrimination. Existing freedom of speech doctrine, especially with
respect to subsidies, depends to a large extent upon the political process to
function and to make sense. This follows from the fact that courts measure the
constitutionality of content-based subsidies in relation to the purposes of those
subsidies, which are themselves defined initially by the government. If one is
looking only for substantive limitations on government's power to
discriminate, this might seem ironic. Where subsidies are at issue, however,
the freedom of speech functions primarily as a disclosure rule, rather than as a
substantive limit on speech discrimination.
Other than on the topic of religion, 291 existing First Amendment doctrine
generally allows government to engage in any kind of speech discrimination
with the use of its resources, as long as it is open about its purposes. If the
government wishes to use its spending power to support or oppose a particular
viewpoint (or group of viewpoints), it may do so as long as it is makes clear
that the program is an exercise of government speech. 292 If it wishes to use a
subsidy to support discussion of a single subject, it may engage in subjectmatter discrimination, provided that it discloses that this is the program's
purpose and does not engage in viewpoint discrimination. 293 If it wishes to use
a subsidy to promote only "quality" work within a particular discipline or field
of study, it may engage in this kind of speech discrimination, as long as the
discrimination is consistent with the program's merit-based standard. 294 Thus,
notwithstanding what some cases say about the impermissibility of viewpoint
or content discrimination, freedom of speech doctrine does not prohibit any
particular kind of speech discrimination by the government. Rather, it requires
openness and consistency: Government may engage in content discrimination
290 See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 537; League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 374.

291 Government may not engage in religious viewpoint discrimination as an exercise of
government speech because the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit
government endorsement of religious views, not because the Speech Clause requires
viewpoint neutrality. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
292 See supra Part III.A (discussing the government speech exception).
293 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
294 See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 206-08 (2003) (recognizing
that public libraries enjoy substantial discretion in selecting material based on quality and
appropriateness, and are not held to the viewpoint-neutral standard of public forums); NEA
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998) ("The NEA's mandate is to make esthetic judgments,
and the inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold for NEA support sets it apart from
the subsidy at issue in Rosenberger."); Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
666, 673-75 (1998) (recognizing inherent viewpoint discrimination in government television
programming decisions).
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in programs that are explicitly designed for content-based purposes, but only to
the extent that such discrimination is consistent with the stated purposes of the
program.
A cynic might argue that this kind of rule only serves to encourage a
government that wishes to discriminate in the use of its funds to restructure or
redefine its spending programs in an explicitly speech-discriminatory fashion.
But this underestimates the power of the political process. Most voters would
be outraged to learn that their tax dollars were being used explicitly to support
an incumbent's reelection campaign, and for this reason we can expect that a
government spending program with such a purpose will never exist. Likewise,
voters expect public colleges to be open-minded and neutral on political topics,
and therefore would be outraged if a state legislature created a new kind of
college explicitly designed to promote the Republican Party platform. The
general public knows that there are certain viewpoints and subjects that are
appropriate subjects of government subsidies and viewpoint discrimination
(including whether democracy is better than dictatorship, whether racism is
good for society, and whether cocaine is healthy), and that there are other
subjects on which government generally should remain neutral (including
controversial social issues, religion, and partisan political issues). The line
between appropriate and inappropriate cases of speech discrimination is real,
but it is always changing and varies from one community to another and from
one program to another.
Current freedom of speech doctrine recognizes that the question of how
neutral or biased government should be, and in what settings it should be
295
biased, is primarily a political choice that courts are unqualified to make.
First Amendment rules concerning subsidies are structured to facilitate this
political choice, not to control it. There is nothing wrong, in principle, with
government using public money to support certain viewpoints, topics or forms
of expression to the exclusion of others, when its preferences are open to the
public. But there is good reason for concern when government creates a
program that purports to be neutral in a particular way, and then implements it
in a way that reflects a narrower bias.
Because the stakes of speech discrimination are high, it is reasonable for
First Amendment law to require, government to inform the public clearly when
it uses public resources for speech discriminatory purposes. The freedom of
speech therefore presumptively requires neutrality in government spending
programs and in special forums, but government may overcome this
presumption if it adequately discloses that the program is designed to

295 As the Supreme Court has stated: "When the government speaks ... to promote its
own policies or to advance a particular idea, it is, in the end, accountable to the electorate
and the political process for its advocacy. If the citizenry objects, newly elected officials
later could espouse some different or contrary position." Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000).
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implement a content-based policy. In this manner, the voting public remains
well informed of the ways in which their government is affirmatively using the
spending power to influence the speech market, keeping this extraordinary
power within its proper political bounds.
CONCLUSION

The principle of the First Amendment that disfavors content discrimination
is one of the most important in constitutional law. It is also poorly understood
and often exaggerated. There are many settings in which the requirement of
neutrality does not apply. Even where it does apply, there are significant
exceptions, and there are often disputes about what it means. We cannot
resolve the many challenging questions concerning the relevancy and meaning
of content discrimination in First Amendment law unless we first understand
why the law sometimes disfavors content discrimination.
I have argued that heightened scrutiny for content-based regulations serves a
primary purpose of preserving plentiful means of communication for all
citizens, toward the end of promoting speech for its informational and
expressive value. This is the same purpose that scrutiny of content-neutral
regulations serves. The distinction between content-based and content-neutral
regulations arises in certain settings from the limitations of judicial review and
in order to facilitate the political process. It does not represent a normative
judgment that government should be impartial toward speech. As long as all
speakers are given ample means of communication, and the public is well
informed of the government's purposes, there is nothing inherently wrong with
governmentally imposed speech discrimination.
Although the theory of content discrimination I have proposed is consistent
with the general structure of First Amendment law, there is plenty of room
within this framework to challenge individual aspects of current doctrine. For
example, one might argue that the rule disfavoring content discrimination
should apply with full force to radio and broadcast television, that the
obscenity exception should be eliminated, that public school students should
have more expressive freedom, or that restrictions on campaign contributions
should be unconstitutional. It is quite possible that current freedom of law
tolerates too many content-based regulations. It is also arguable that courts
should recognize some additional categories of permissible content-based
regulation.
In deciding what types of content-based regulations are acceptable, courts
should be guided by the goal of protecting speech for its ultimate value to
society. The analysis should recognize, among other things, the significant
value of unpopular and offensive speech, the importance of bright-line rules,
and the danger of slippery slopes. What is unhelpful to the analysis, however,
are general First Amendment pronouncements condemning content
discrimination as inherently wrong, such as the famous quote from Moseley:
"[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power
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to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content. '296 Such statements are incorrect as a description of current First
Amendment law, misguided as to the purposes of the freedom of speech and, if
taken seriously, would do more harm than good for the quality of speech in
society.

296 Police Dep't of Chi. v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

